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THE MAKING OF COLONIAL ZIMBABWE:
COMPROMISE OF THE SETTLER STATE 1923 - 1929
I cannot quite get over the fact of the huge
profits the Trusts make out of the tobacco
which we are trying to grow out here by the
sweat of our brows, or perhaps I should say
the natives' ... The fact of Directors of
the Trusts dying multimillionaires ... makes
one wonder if they ever think of where all
their money comes from and how it is that a
few crumbs from their groaning tables are not
let fall to enable the growers in Rhodesia, or
in other parts of the world for that matter,
to make a bare living ... (Minister of Agri-
culture and Lands, to High Commissioner, 9
March 1929)
Although international capital initially viewed the
Referendum result 'and Southern Rhodesia's assumption of
Responsible Government with considerable apprehension, its
* fears soon evaporated. It became clear that the alignment
of domestic interests in 1920 had been a vote against the
Chartered Administration rather than one unreservedly in
favour of Responsible Government. The unity displayed in
the 1920 elections by white farmers determined to bring
Company rule to an end, was in tatters by 1922. A clear
majority, mainly ranchers and tobacco planters for whom the
South African market was essential, voted for Union; the
remainder, primarily Mashonaland maize farmers keen to retain
local produce markets for themselves, wanted Responsible
Government.
Not only was the domestic bourgeoisie itself fragemented,
but its electoral ties with organised white labour were tenu-
ous/
2.
ous and easily disturbed, making it extremely vulnerable
to the deliberate process of penetration instituted by
large capital from 1923 onwards. 'Three quarters of ...
/they electors may safely be said to possess no property
whatsoever', observed Goldfields' Rhodesian manager,
the taxable population is extremely limited, and
the mine and land-owning companies will, I have
no doubt, become the chief source of revenue and
be heavily dealt with I fear, perhaps to a very
serious extent, unless they take vigorous steps
to protect their interests ... £At7 the coming
election ... we must do vhac we can irrespective
of party to return as many sound thinking men
2
as we can.
And Coghlan, as impatient of white labour's political pre-
tensions as he was wary of its allegedly syndicalist ten-
dencies, was only too ready to oblige. The colony, he
said, needed a '"best man" Government'. In practice, this
meant an open door to erstwhile opponents who 'have shown
by their deeds as well as professions, that they have
dropped Union'. By 1925, 'the General Manager of the
British South Africa Company, the Manager of Wankie Col-
lieries, the Manager of Rhodesia Railways and others from
the Chambers of Mines' were all backbenchers on the Govern-
ment side of the Legislative Assembly.
The constitution, moreover, was hedged about with
safeguards. Under the Letters Patent and Governor's
Instructions of 1 September 1923, the authority of the
Legislative Assembly was considerably circumscribed.
Reserved/
3.
Reserved clauses precluded it from passing laws 'whereby
natives may be subject or made liable to any conditions,
disabilities, or restrictions, to which persons of European
descent are not also subjected or made liable1; from 'any
law dealing with railways within the Colony until legisla-
tion had been passed adopting with necessary modifications
the United Kingdom law dealing with Railway and Canal Com-
missioners and the Rates Tribunal provided for in the Rail-
ways Act, 1921'; and from 'any law altering ... arrangement
... relating to mining revenue or imposing any special
taxation on minerals', as well as from any law amending the
Constitution. Nor did the Assembly's legislative authority
8
'extend to extra-territorial matters'. Measures affecting
the currency and the imposition of differential duties were
also proscribed. Even the question of nationality fell
outside of its sphere of competence; before 194 9 Southern
g
Rhodes:.^n citizenship did not exist..
Grudgingly handed over, 'pared down to the minimum,.
hemmed in with limitations and loaded with servitudes',
the constitution fell well short of Responsible Government.
It was, as some contemporaries appreciated, 'the next step
towards complete self-government*. In the meantime, it
was designed to perform three main functions: 'to protect
the rights of capital, prevent discriminatory legislation
against Africans without Imperial sanction, and stop Souther.
from passing laws incompatible with the-more general
Rhodesia ^ interests of the Imperial connexion1. The settle
state form, in other words, was a carefully crafted com-
promise between local and metropolitan accumulation. As
the/
the dependent partner, the settler state was obliged to
accept constitutional provisions seeking to guard against
initiatives which might disturb the orderly accumulation
of capital in general. Together, these factors produced
a thoroughly conservative successor to the Chartered State,
so much so that 'the average /Legislative Assembly^7 session
of the 'twenties resembl£e<37 more a well-conducted share-
1 3holders' meeting than a national convention1.
Typically, though, most of the shares were held out-
side of the colony. Southern Rhodesia's mineral rights,
raiV.ray system, asbestos ininet;, its only collisry and its
daily press were all foreign-owned. The chrome industry
was effectively in the grip of one foreign company and a
hand f ul of British and South African mining companies
produced almost three-quarters of the territory's gold
output. By contrast, foreign investment was much less
prominent in agriculture. The only exceptions were the
largest beef cattle ranches, the citrus industry, and
the enormous acreage still held by the corporate survivors
of the speculative 1890s.
The social formation inherited by the domestic bour-
geoisie in 1923 was further distinguished by a uniquely
concentrated pattern of ownership. 'The peculiarity, of
the Rhodesian economic field1, wrote Round Table magazine,
'is that it contains practically only one capitalist - the
powerful financial group which comprises the B.S.A. - Company
1 4
and its subsidiary companies'. As well as possessing
the colony's mineral rights and railway system, both
of/
of which enjoyed Imperial protection through the constitu-
tion1 s reserved clauses, the B.S.A. Company had fingers,
occasionally a whole hand, in many pies. In 1925, it held
an estimated 70 percent of the shares in Wankie Colliery
Company Ltd, and owned the Mazoe Citrus Estates and a huge
2,5 million-acre cattle ranch at Nuanetsi. The Company was
also significantly interested in Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd,
in the Rhodesian & General Asbestos Corporation, in
Goldfields of Rhodesia, and in other mining and exploration
companies. And not least, through the foresight of its
founder, Cecil Rhodes, and its continued association with
Rand mining houses, the Company could invariably rely on
a friendly press from the Argus Group, parent of the
Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company which brought out
' 15
Salisbury's Rhodesia Herald and Bulawayo's Chronicle.
Consequently, by the mid-1920s, the B.S.A. Company itself
'or through their associate companies ... /ytasj interested
in not less than 60 percent of the traffic which travel£led7
1 fi
over . . . /Bhodesia~7 railways ' .
During the next decade, the corporate web described
above was immeasurably strengthened by the development of
the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, especially once an
elaborate railway rating system was set in place for the
mutual benefit of the inter-linked railway, coal and copper
companies. The resulting 'extensive and interlocking
interests' were perfectly symbolised in the bulky figure of
Sir Edmund Davis. Davis, an Australian who made a fortune
from guano deposits off the coast of the Cape Colony, railway
construction, and the cynical amalgamation in 1889 of the
Bechuanaland Exploration Company with Rhodes and his backers
in/
6.
in order to ensure that a Royal Charter was granted to the B.S..?
Company, eventuall sat on the boards of more than 50 companies.
At the time of his death in 1939, he was
Chairman and managing director of the Wankie Colliery Co.
Ltd, Rhodesia Broken Hill Development Co. Ltd, Fanti Con-
solidated Investment Co. Ltd, and of East African Lands
and Development Co. Ltd; Chairman of Bechuananland
Exploration Co. Ltd, Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd, Rhodesian
& General Asbestos Corporation Ltd, Rhodesia Copper
and General Exploration and Finance Co. Ltd, African
Chrome Mines Ltd, African Manganese Co. Ltd, Balu-
chistan Chrome Co. Ltd; Deputy Chairman of Rhodesian
Anglo-American Ltd, and Rhokana Corporation Ltd; and
a director of the British South Africa Co., Mufulira
Copper Mines Ltd, Northern Rhodesia Power Corporation
Ltd, Southern Rhodesia Metals Ltd, the Anglo American
Corporation of South Africa Ltd, and of other enter-
18
prises.
1 9Powerful enough to 'make or break the Rhodesian economy1 severe
times over, Davis often loomed large in the calculations of settlt
politicians. 'Everybody knows that the economic dictator of th:
country is Sir Edmund Davis', the House of Assembly was told.
•There may be a case of monarchy; but the King should not sit
20in an office in London, he should be a Rhodesian1.
On the few occasions that the settler government was moved
challenge the entrenched position of international capital, it
came off worst. Invariably, it emerged from confrontation
rumpled, perhaps clutching a new and shiny agreement which on
close inspection revealed yet another compromise in big capital's
favour. This was cleary the case when attempts to investigate
the extent of absentee landlordism and tax unproductive land wer
21
emasculated, and was still more apparent when the government
mounted/
7.
mounted a half-hearted assault against Rhodesia Railways. Because
Southern Rhodesia's remoteness from world markets made the level
of transport costs vitally important, railway rating policies were
frequently and loudly disputed by settlers and by those companies
excluded from the.charmed circle of Chartered associates. For the
settlers in particular, the railway companies had come to symbolise
monopoly control over both the cost of their day-to-day living and
their long-term prospects in the country, and at key moments had
constituted an emotive rallying point against continued Chartered
rule. 'The disease afflicting Rhodesia', sneered the Reform Com-
mittee in 1903, 'takes the form of a fine Imperialism degenerated
c-t length into coiuntrciil avarice. 'Ihe country has been made iood
for a monopoly, and is strangling to death within the grasp of
the Rhodesia Railways Trust. This corporation of capitalists has
sapped the resources of settlers and immigrants, drained the meagre
profits of growing concerns, bled the funds of better established
ones'.
Much to the chagrin of many colonists, this same 'corporation
of capitalists' survived the ending of Chartered rule unscathed.
Spokesmen who before the granting of Responsible Government had
lamented the fact that 'in our case, instead of the Government of
the country controlling the .railways and protecting the public
from the railways, the Government of the country was here to
23
protect the railways against the people of the country1, after-
wards found that they were constitutionally hamstrung in their
efforts to reverse the equation. As Coghlan was also determined
to foster a climate of business confidence in the fledgling colony,
he therefore reacted cautiously at the start of his premiership
to renewed protests by farmers and miners over high railway rates.
The Government instituted a commission of enquiry into railway
affairs, and after some bluster but strictly in accordance with
8.
the constitution, passed the Railway Act of 1926 which set up a
24
special tribunal to oversee the system. 'In the place of the
present regime, leaving the Railway Companies at liberty (a) to
charge what they think proper for railway services and (b) to
dissipate in dividends whatever portion of the railway receipts
they think fit', explained the Government, 'a statutory control
is established by which (a) charges are limited to the measure
of the just remuneration of the capital employed and (b) dividends
are restricted to the same limit, the balance being accumulated
to an amount of £1,500,000, a sum which is kept in the control
of an independent commission and applied for purposes of railway
improvement'.
While the new Act undoubtedly strengthened the hand of
settler governments, at least by comparison to what had gone
before, it soon became apparent tht its successful operation
depended too much on the.personality of the commission's chairman,
never mind the goodwill of the railway companies. In addition,
by glossing over the railways' financial history and capital
structure (whose characteristic lack of liquidity was due in- large
measure to an excessive ratio of debenture /Interest-bearing shares
27to ordinary capital), the Act did little to assuage popular
suspicion that the capital of the companies concerned had been
deliberately 'watered1 or inflated in the past in order to maximise
maintenance and renewal charges on debenture issues. As these
annual fixed interest charges had first call on railway earnings,
the Railway Act, so it was argued, only came into operation after
most of the real profits had already been 'swallowed up by deben-
ture interest (the debentures being held by friends of the B.S.A.
Co.) so that there will be hidden from the public the colossal
profits that are being made1.-*1 Still other opponents of the Act
who/
9.
who admittedly mixed innuendo with informed comment when dismissing
it as leaving 'the Railway Company in full administrative and finan-
29
cial control of the railways', nonetheless identified its funda-
mental weakness. In attempting to deal with Rhodesia Railways in
isolation, the Act simply encouraged the juggling of profits from
the railways to other B.S.A. Company concerns. 'By limiting the
dividends of the railways, said Sir Hugh Williams, leader of the
Reform Party, 'you have merely succeeded in making the railways,
which should be used to develop this Colony, a pawn in other games.
Profits that might have been made are diverted to promote other
interests of this corporation'.
Two years after the passage of the Railway Act, settler poli-
ticians were afforded a rare glimpse of how certain of these
interests interacted in practice when Government policy momentarily
threatened to disturb the cosy relationship between the railway
companies and their friends. At stake was the construction of a
branch railway line to open up chrome deposits in the Umvukwes
region. As the proposed line would benefit small independent
producers to the detriment of the huge Chrome Trust in which the
B.S.A. Company was interested, the railway companies refused to
cooperate. Their opposition made it quite plain 'that where chrome
was concerned the railways were controlled from St. Swithin's Lane',
the headquarters of the Trust. Angry cabinet ministers, denoun-
cing the companies for 'usurping a function which is not theirs1,
emphasised that railways should 'develop countries as well as ...
sell transport1. 'Those functions', said the Minister of Mines
and Public Works, 'must be looked at from the public utility point
of view, not from that of a C.O.D. merchant'.32 Deadl°<=* ensued,
but for once it was shortlived because the Government was able to
play off the Trust against another large group, and Rhodesia Railway-
were/
10.
were forced to give way. The victory was nullified, however, when
the newcomer was soon afterwards swallowed by the Trust (see below
and with monopolistic conditions restored, rates on the branch
line were manipulated to the disadvantage of the remaining small
33
mines.
Apart from this brief interlude, international capital was
left in unchallenged possession of base mineral mining. In 1923,
shortly before surrendering its administrative powers, the
Chartered Company tightened its already powerful grip on Southern
Rhodesia's coal deposits by making over an exclusive prospecting
area of 880 square miles to Wankie Colliery- The grant wss to
last for 30 years, and practically eliminated the possibility of
a rival colliery being started. Not content with rewarding its
acumen with an additional 40 000 paid-up Colliery shares, the
B.S.A. Company then presided over an imaginative reconstruction
of Wankie Colliery Company Ltd. In an exercise designed to hide
the real return to capital, shareholders were allotted three
shares in a new company of the same name for every two shares
previously held, as a result of which issued share capital in-"
creased by £313 670 to £881 001. Even so, the Colliery, which
increasingly came to occupy a pivotal position in the mining
economy of Central Africa, provided its owners with an average
34
annual dividend of almost 14 percent between 1924 and 1938.
For much of the 1920s, Southern Rhodesia's asbestos produc-
t-ion was dominated by the Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corpora-
tion, and by the Asbestos Corporation, a subsidiary of the large
British asbestos manufacturing and marketing combine, Turner and
Newall. Although worked locally as far back as 1908, asbestos
was first mined in significant quantities during the First World
War/
11
War. Expanding world demand encouraged the B.S.A. Company and its
allies, notably the Charterland and General Exploration and
Finance Company and the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, to
invest heavily in the newly attractive industry, but only after
amalgamating their interests in order to prevent over-production.
'We desire to obtain control of the Rhodesia asbestos trade', ex-
plained the ubiquitous Edmund Davis, ' ... and in the course of
time, not only build up a large industry but'create a name for
Rhodesian asbestos in markets all over the world, as it is the
only way to make a success of the venture and obtain a satisfac-
tory return on the very large amount of capital which wil.l h?.ve
to be invested in the concern'. Registered in 1917, the
Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corporation was responsible for
almost three-quarters of the colony's output by 1926. Its only
serious rival was Turner and Newall's Asbestos Corporation which
had buttressed its southern African position by buying up weaker
companies during the recession.0
The two corporations, however, shared a common interest in
securing a place for southern. African'asbestos in the world market
The Davis group in particular waged a savage price-cutting war
against Canadian producers in the mid-twenties, despite which both
African concerns regularly paid high dividends. Their competitive
edge was supplied by the low cost of black labour and by the
informal vertical integration of their mining and manufacturing
interests. And when international competition again intensified
at the end of the decade following the introduction of moulded
brake linings which lessened demand for the previously most
profitable grades of asbestos, informal cooperation was quickly
transformed into formal merger. In 1929, Rhodesian and General
shareholders were invited to" exchange their holdings for shares
in/
12.
in Turner and Newall, thus cementing monopoly production in
southern Africa to British marketing and manufacturing organisa-
tion. By the time the Great Depression caused base mineral prices
to fall still further Turner and Newall were powerful enough to
insist on an important share of the dwindling world market. An
arrangement was reached with the Soviet Union, the only other
major producer of asbestos apart from Canada, 'in collaboration
with the principal consumers in Europe, with a view to the
stabilis a tion of the market on a basis satisfactory to all con-
cerned1 . Russia promised not to dump surplus asbestos on the
European market, while Turner and Newall agreed to curtail their
Southern Rhodesian operations. By 1931, local asbestos mines
37
were working at two-thirds capacity.
' In the chrome industry, the story was much the same, only
more so. Output was effectively determined by one international
company whose control on a world scale of production and marketing
allowed it to influence prices and make national production deci-
sions without reference to its host countries. Initial develop-
ment of Southern Rhodesia's various chrome deposits had been in
the hands of a number of smallworkers and companies who had found
it individually impossible to break into the world market. Davis1
Bechuanaland Exploration Company, for example, was told by 'a firm
who apparently control about- two-thirds of the trade . . . that.
for the next two or probably three years the Companies interested
in Rhodesia will not be able to dispose of any large quantity of
Chrome Ore owing to contracts having been made from New Caledonia,
39Turkey and other countries for forward delivery'. Realising that
they had 'to do away with possible ruinous competition' among them-
selves, most of the territory's leading chrome producers amalga-
mated/
13.
TABLE IX: ASBESTOS, CHROME AND COAL PRODUCTION, 190 8 - 19 3238
YEAR
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
15'. 5
1916
1917
1918
>j 1-919
1 920
1 921
1922
1923
\ 1924
1925
. 1926
1927
1928
1 929
1930
' 1931
1932
ASBESTOS
Tons
2
6
9
8
9
18
19
14
20
26
.34
33
33
39
42
37
24
15
55
272
332
460
-
290
487
010
157
562
574
800
823
529
249
364
141
349
344
176
960
634
766
042
766
. £
Value
2
3
6
5
8
32
99
189
158
425
459
795
577
626
603
766
726
794
970
1 186
1 070
386
197
550
725
320
396
-
224
612
130
059
890
684
240
572
699
699
880
423
381
835
215
327
627
847
494 .
092
CHROME
Tons
13
25
44
52
69
63
48
60
88
72
31
35
60
50
; 93
1
 96
172
135
181
218
219
:293
226
89
17
358
620
002
363
261
383
207
581
871
962
286
283
269
188
475
675
7 24
827 •
194
018
428
116
671
974
298
£
Value
37
60
98
116
154
141
107
'.75
333
327
134
142
245
195
302
244
432
337
420
490
471
674
519
224
33
024
420
132
965
600
480
612
792
170
347
857
541
378
360
880
582
482
317
334
653
667
937
581
186
732
1
1
1
1
Tons
164
170
180
212
216
243
34 9
409
491
548
491
510
578
574
515
617
652
759
96 3
001
206
142
034
647
482
COAL
114
893
068
529
140
328
459
763
582
954
268
040
4 92
753
610
297
049
718
579
724
864
900
785
341
925
£
Value
(iric.
coke
61
77
88
92
73
78
115
U 3
131
179
164
189
252
256
225
252
265
324
399
41 9
511
516
476
3.0 4
223
)
907
313
223
193
268
431
099
194
468
588
851
138
220
815
34 5
01 1
992
511
229
700
819
649
773
514
381
14.
mated their interests in June 1908 to form Rhodesia Chrome
Mines.Ltd, and promptly flung thier combined resources into
battle against established competitors. 'In the Chrome
proposition1, recalled Davis,
we fought the price steadily down from 67s. 6d. to
40s., and then, luckily, the French owners of the
New Caledonian proposition were satisfied that we
should fight them to a standstill and offered to
sell out. We formed a Company to acquire their
property with a capital of £190,000 ... Those
interested in the Rhodesian chrome proposition
found this large amount of capital, most loyal
ffssistfinco being given by the British South Africa
Company, which recognised the absolute necessity
of acquiring the Caledonian proposition to safe-
4 1guard the position of the Rhodesian.
Production thereafter grew dramatically, until at the peak
of war-time demand in 1916 almost 90 000 tons valued at
£333 170 were exported.
During the 1920s it suited the Chrome Trust to expand
its Rhodesian activities to the point where the colony
accounted for over half of the world's production in 1929.
Three years later output slumped to eight percent of the
world total because of the Depression sr.z. because zhe Trust ' 5
production strategies changed in order to eliminate a
regional competitor. For some time pas^, a rival grouping
had been expanding production in southern Africa, and it
seems that the Trust utilised the contraction in the world
market caused by the Depression, along with its access to
chrome production and supplies outside of Africa, to 'shut
out' its rival's chrome. By early 1932, enough pressure
had been exerted, and the Trust bought up the opposition.
During/ ...
15-
During this entire exercise, the settler government sat
powerless to intervene, beyond denunciations in the Legisla-
tive Assembly of those 'who control in Rhodesia every other
form of life, who control the chrome, the copper and the
asbestos, and will subject those people engaged in those
industries to desolation because it suits their market mani-
14-- . 4 3
pulations'.
Settler experiences in agriculture were equally unhappy.
At the time of Responsible Government, capitalist agriculture
(almost exclusively white in complexion) comprised a mass
of small, undercapitalised farmers around a core of tig
concerns, either individually or company owned. Smallholding
44
aside, estates ranged in size from the enormous 'spreads'
covering hundreds of thousands of acres owned by a dozen or
so land and ranching companies; to the 1 0 - 2 0 000-acre
plantations of 'older established1 farmers; down to the
2 - 4 000-acre farms common 'where capital is limited'.
As a rule, holdings were larger' in the dryer and hotter
parts of the country, specifically Matabeleland and s outhern
Mashonaland. Altogether, an estimated 2 500 white farmers
46
occupied 31,2 million acres in 1925. Precisely how these
figures were disaggregated structurally is noi clear, but
•in 1950, the first year for which detailed and reliable
census returns on this subject are available, over 4 1 percent
of the total area alienated to 'European agriculture1 was
accounted for by less than three percent of the total number
of holdings. Farms between 1 000 and 5 000 acres were most
numerous but although they represented 57,-30 percent of the
total number they only covered slightly over 27 percent of
the/
16.
the 'white' countryside. Fully 80 percent were owner-
occupied.
Production too was highly concentrated. In
1933, the four biggest cattle owners in the country, 'that
is, 1.4 percent of those on the roll of the Stockowners 1
Association, owned 54 percent of the European cattle herd 1,
while a decade earlier, 17 farmers, representing '8 percent
of the members of the Maize Association, /nad7 contributed
195 000 bags or almost half (45.4%) of the total European
£maize7 crop 1. Put another way, 139 so-called 'Mealie Kings
out of 1 34 4 maize growers were responsible for more than
4 9half the total production.
In large measure, this reflected the varying degree
to which farms and ranches were capitalised. Although most
agricultural enterprises in Southern Rhodesia were notorious!
undercapitalised, there were important exceptions. These
included the B.S.A. Company's own estates, Liebigs, later on
the Rhodesia Land, Cattle & Ranching Corporation at Nuanetsi,
and perhaps upwards of 150 individuals, most notably D. Black
R. D. Gilchrist, O. C. Rawson and J. A. Edmonds. Almost "
from the start, these producers imported agricultural
machinery and artificial fertilisers. The primary stimulus
for this development was the shortage of agricultural labour
which lasted from the turn of the century until about 1912.
'The rapidity with which Rhodesian farmers are securing
machinery is astonishing when the cost is considered 1,
observed the Agricultural Department in 1904. 'Disc ploughs,
disc harrows, and the best horse-hoes are found on the majo-
rity of farms. Mealie drills are common, mowing machines
are coming into general use ... Hay rakes, shredders, bailing
presses/
17.
presses, winnowers, seeders, potato-planters, and potato-
ploughs are numerous. Windmills and graders are becoming
more common'. A petrol-driven tractor costing £343 was
brought out to a large farm near Salisbury, and even tractioi
engines and steam ploughs were imported by those who could
afford not to wait for supplies of trained oxen to become
available again, or for quarantine restrictions to be lifted
in the wake of East Coast Fever. By 1905, the planting,
cultivating, reaping and shredding of maize were all mecha-
nised on the B.S.A. Company's Premier Estate, outside Umtali.
On the same estate, so readers of the Rhode si an Agricultural
Journal were informed, fertiliser imported at a cost of
£10 - 12 per ton had 'more than doubled the yield of pota-
52toes'. Thereafter, the rate of mechanisation slackened as
the industry's capacity to pay for additional imports was
exhausted and the supply of labour slowly improved. Only
the biggest producers persisted with the introduction of
'steam and oil ploughing outfits'. •Costly machinery of
this description', noted the Director of Agriculture in 1913,
'must be constantly employed in order to prove remunerative;
and is not purchased by the small farmer or the beginner'.
The same group of large-scale producers were virtually
the only ones who practised scientific farming. In parti-
cular, they worked at improving yields through the careful
selection of seed and the importation of pedigreed livestock.
By 1910, Edmonds, for example, whose farm 'Glen Lome' close
to Salisbury bore witness to 'skilled methods of carrying
oh agricultural work', already provided oat seed 'of good
germination/
18.
germination which commands a ready sale to all parts of the
54
country'. As the agricultural industry's pace settlers,
they were prominently featured in the pages of the Rhode-
sia [nj Agricultural Journal, and were frequent exhibitors
on local and South African agricultural shows, even making
a clean sweep of the prestigious Rand Show in 1919.
By contrast, the great majority of white farmers were
perennially short of money, and possessed only the most
rudimentary agricultural knowledge. The Chartered Admini-
stration and later settler governments consistently under-
estimated the amount of capital needed to establish inter.dinc
settlers on the land. Between 1908 and 1928, callers at the
London Head Office of the Company or Rhodesia House were
told that all they required was £500 - 1 000. In part, such
advice stemmed from cynical appreciation of Southern Rhode-
sia's limited appeal to people of means. 'The type of set-
tler which is most needed ... is the one most difficult to
secure1, reported Wilson Fox, 'not only because other Colo-
nies compete for it, but because a first-class man with
capital can make a good living at home1. Instead, the
Company deliberately set its sights on would-be colonists
'with insufficient capital ... Zas_7 the class which is most
promising for Rhodesian purposes', and by 1924 had managed
to entice 6 557 men, women and children into its domain.
Total capital introduced by these immigrants was £2 338 562.""
Settlement schemes supposedly compensated for inadequate
capital either by recruiting experienced farmers or by makinc
provision for agricultural training inside Southern Rhodesia
itself. To some extent, the first criterion was met in South
Africa,/
19.
Africa, but recruiting campaigns pursued overseas were fre-
quently clouded by the social posturing of politicians.
'What the country needed', declared Godfrey Huggins in the
Legislative Assembly, 'were young men who had "fagged at
school and have been flogged at school"'. Disillusioned
managers of the B.S.A. Company1s central training farms
soon found that their charges preferred 'to ride and shoot
and have an easy time1. 'The young fellows who come out to
learn farming do not as a rule see the necessity of down-
right strenuous labour1, commented Sir Lewis Michell.
Never one to threw good money alter bad, the Company closed
59down the training side of its farms, all of them by 1916,
and simply concentrated on promoting land sales until the
Privy Council decision of 1918 caused it to lose interest.
After 1923, selection procedure, already less than rigorous,
was loosened by settler governments pledged to encourage
white settlement in the countryside. Attracted by stories
of Central Africa's seemingly boundless agricultural possi-
bilities and subsidised by the Imperial Government's postwar
Empire Settlement scheme, hundreds of aspirant farmers and •
planters descended on the colony. Amor.g them was the Tayler
family, whose five-year-old daughter was to become known
to later gener a tions as Doris Lessing. Over 2 000 settle
entered Southern Rhodesia between 1925 and 1928, but due to
'very lax ^[selection7 ... during the cotton and tobacco boom
... many men Z^hoJ were allowed to ... take up land were
entirely unsuitable1.
Several decades of playing fast and loose with land
settlement policy created a large and expanding constituency
of/
20.
of white farmers who lived from hand to mouth. Indeed, the
general character of settler agriculture had changed quite
markedly in the process. Whereas in 1910 'the average
farmer ... /5as7 a man of substance, and often of experience
and education as well', by the 1920s the reverse was true.
Most immigrant farmers found the process of •buying their
own experience1 ruinously expensive, and few of them could
'withstand the strain ... (s>fj an adverse season1. No less
than 401 out of 1 185 land title grants issued by the
Chartered Administration were relinquished in the period
641913 - 1921. Average income in 1922, an admittedly 'bad'
year, was only £146, and by 1924 hundreds of farmers still on
the land were close to financial collapse. Of 2 400 farmers
liable for quitrent, 1 525 were in arrears. In 1927, at
the height of the tobacco boom, white farmers earned an
annual average income of £214, still well below the- £300 p.a.
officially deemed necessary to maintain a rural family of
three or four in comfort.
When the tobacco market slumped in 1928, farmers' in-
comes fell accordingly. A chastened Ministry of Agriculture
conducted an investigation into the agricultural industry's
capitalisation, and belatedly conceded that the settlement
policies implemented by previous administrations had invited
disaster. According to Departmental calculations,
The farmer's dwelling furnished complete must
not cost more than £250; he is allowed two
cows and £5 worth of poultry, and his living
expenses must not exceed £120. He cannot,
however, get out of paying the merchants some
big bills; he must, among other things, buy a
plough at £42 10s., a disc-harrow at £32 10s.,
a/
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a planter at £25, and a wagon at £110. In
all the new settler has spent at the end of
the first year a total of £1 225, but even
if he is lucky enough to have got in his
"estimated revenue" he cannot go on as he
finds himself facing the second year's
expenditure with a shortage of £300. The
lowest estimate of capital, therefore, which
will enable this frugal farmer to continue,
after the first year, to develop the many
67
virtues he must possess, is placed at £1 500.
As this estimate made no allowance for the purchase or lease
of a farm, nor any provision for 'such items of expense as
medical services, school fees, erection of dipping tank,
cart and mules or car1, it was clear that most settlers
on the land had started farming operations with approximately
half the amount of capital they actually needed to have a
reasonable chance of success.
The other side of the coin of inadequate capital and
inexperience was amateurism and opportunism. Agricultural
loans were sometimes misused to fpay off pressing personal
bills' and to support a 'disastrously widespread ... sun-
6 9downer habit'. Private capital, when available, was often
frittered away. An early observer of the white farming scene
noted money spent on 'greyhounds for coursing buck', while
stockyards were left unfenced. Housing sometimes received
disproportionate expenditure to the detriment of productive
investment, but most common was the purchase of unsuitable
equipment and stock. Farms were bought, crops selected and
fields laid out in almost total ignorance of local conditions
Typically, a farmer would
tramp/
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tramp his thousand dry acres, shoulder high
in majestic grass, or he would trace the
gentle slopes of a river valley or vlei and
decide perhaps to try cotton? Surely cotton
climates differed little enough from this, and
the soil looked all right - see the marvellous
grass! Or perhaps he would think, 'Jove, what
a mealie field this will make, with maize at
£1 a bag my fortune will be made!1 Perhaps
the young farmer would favour the hills and
his farm would lie'among the rough and rugged
little kopjies piled high with lichened granite
boulders and wooded with slender trees.
'Cattle!1 he would think, and his imagination
sprang to the growing towns of Salisbury and
Umtali and he could see his animals loaded
into the open trucks and shuttling regularly
to the abattoirs in the towns.
Farming methods were generally poor, and once established
proved difficult to eradicate, not least because of the
chronically undercapitalised state of most producers. As
early as 1911, the Government Agriculturalist pointed to
evidence from 'the older established farms in the Rhodesian
maize belt that continuous cropping is tending to reduce the
72
average acre yield'. While some farmers acted on the
warning, the majority were precluded from following suit
73by the prohibitive price of artificial fertilisers. By
1927, the low average maize yield was attributed, among other
reasons, to 'dirty £l.e. weed-choke<J7 lands, due probably to
the grower planting out a bigger acreage than can be properly
worked, £and7 planting too close, with the result that the
74
cobs are stunted and in many cases no cobs form1. 'Poor
or starved soil' had become a major problem because of the
inability/
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inability or reluctance of most farmers to use fertilisers.
Even green manuring was economically impossible for most
producers. The cultivation of green crops for ploughing
under occupied fields which might otherwise carry cash crops.
Few planters could postpone short-term returns for long-
term viability. During the 1928-9 season, less than one
percent of white farmers growing maize used green manure.
But the crude and cost-cutting methods employed by small
farmers were not entirely attributable to inexperience and
undercapitalisation. In most cases, agricultural practice
was determined by an additional consideration. Farming, in
the opinion of many, was very much a 'speculative gamble1.
Starting, from just before the First World War, Southern
Rhodesia's soils were 'mined' or robbed of their value for
over a generation by settlers desperately keen to 'get-rich-
quick1 . Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, small
farmers tended to 'rush* from crop to different crop in
search of the riches which had so far eluded them. The
tobacco industry in particular was periodically seized with
speculative fever. At the time of the first tobacco boom
of 1912-14, one favoured region, Marandellas, 'was almost
like a mining camp, so full was it of eager young (and old)
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speculators'. In the mid-twenties land was again hastily
taken up by hundreds of new planters, eager to make their •
fortunes and easily persuaded, in the words of the novelist
Gertrude Page, that 'in Rhodesia, you ... Zcoul47 grow lots
79
of things by chiefly looking at niggers'. These were
the so-called 'stoep farmers' who 'cultivated their crops
from the veranda of Meikles•Hotel, the great social gathering
place/
24.
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place in Salisbury1. 'Taken as a whole, concluded the
colony's Chief Agriculturalist in 1928
they have not yet got down to solid serious
farming ... instances are numerous where, after
years spent on the same farm, the owner is no
nearer to a settled policy and a solid basis to
his business than when he started. There are also
many cases where second best methods are thought
to be good enough, but in farming there is no
greater fallacy than this. The only man who will
succeed on the land is the one with a clearly
thought out and settled policy ... and above all
who brings to every operation of the farm ... a
maximum standard of efficiency. Today these con-
ditions are far from being realised. Some farms
are over-stocked. Very few farmers grow sufficient
of the most suitable food crops for the require-
ments of their livestock. Winter ploughing is
widely neglected, poor ploughing is of common
occurrence, planting is often delayed unduly late,
and weeds are not adequately controlled ... Many
non-successes are unquestionably due to lack of
system ... and to dropping one line of activity
before it has been fully studied in order to
snatch at something newer and apparently more
81
attractive.
It was a phenomenon which both imparted an extraordinar/ly
volatile element to the volume of production, and aggravated
the highly uneven productivity of commercial agriculture
as a whole. Indeed, white farmers seemed destined to share
the fate of the biblical swine of Gadarene, until the state
was eventually persuaded to provide safety nets for those
who successively hurled themselves over the 'cliffs' of
cattle, cotton, tobacco and maize.
TABLE/
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TABLE X: MAIZE, TOBACCO AND COTTON PRODUCTION, 1920-982
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
920/1
921/2
922/3
923/4
924/5
925/6
926/7
927/8
928/9
929/30
MAIZE
Production
(Bags)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
220
662
505
080
068
393
659
268
826
917
768
636
580
084
904
654
597
100
345
252
Value
£
672
387
364
565
594
481
697
808
666
762
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
TOBACCO
(Virginian)
Production
(lbs)
3
2
2
3
1
5
18
24
6
5
193
880
541
426
987
313
631
491
704
494
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
Value
£
121
215
174
154
216
141
393
1 731
779
271
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
COTTON
Production
(lbs)
1
5
8
1
-
-
-
691
88 8
220
735
114
339
906
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
Value
£
41
77
76
4
2
4
-
-
-
-
000
000
000
000
000
000
TABLE XI: MAIZE YIELDS BY SIZE OF PRODUCER, 1921-983
Size of
Maize
Producer
301 acres
plus
1921/2
1928/9
201 to
300
acres
1921/2
1928/9
101 to 200
acres
1921/2
1928/9
100 acres
or less
1921/2
1928/9
NO.
of
Producers
139
258
113
175
178
398
914
1 451
Maize
Acreage
by size
of
Producer
74 .000
153 000
30 000
46 000
28 000
61 000
37 000
65 000
Average
Maize
Acreage
per
Farm
534
594
268
263
156
153
40
45
Yield
per
Acre
(bags)
4,95
6,52
3,79
5,53
2,50
5,15
1 ,84
3,99
Average
Harvest
per
Farm
(bags)
2 648
3 8.70
1 016
1 456
392
789
74
179
Total
Crop
(bags)
368 000
998 000
115 M0
255 000
70 000
314 000
68 000
259 000
In/
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In the early 1920s, the need to find cattle export
84
markets had become urgent. A large and fairly indiscri-
minate wartime demand which had helped cattle owners build
up an export trade, gave way in 1921-2 to recession and
falling prices. Southern Rhodesian ranches were particularly
hard-hit because most of their animals were low-grade. The
colony's small domestic market was quite unable to absorb
significant numbers, and as the surplus grew, so prices
were further depressed. Average export prices received for
cattle fell from about £18 per head in 1921 to approximately
£5 in 1922 and 1923.85
Ranchers initially tried to market their cattle by
mobilising domestic capital in co-operative ventures. A
canning factory was set up in 1919 at Odzi, near Umtali,
but went out of business withjn three years. To some extent,
this was due to the familiar problem of undercapitalisation.
Capital raised by subscription had been fully 'absorbed in
the erection of the Factory and they had ^subsequently^ run
on capital borrowed from the bank'. A more important reason
for failure was the tremendous competition encountered in
the post-war meat market. The entire canning industry was
depressed by the surplus stocks of canned meats off-loaded
by the British and American governments at the end of the
First World War. In addition, the big American packing
houses were reported as 'selling corned beef to Germany at a
low price and giving 12 to 18 months credit, so that they
could get rid of their stocks and cut their losses', while
even the adjacent South African market was lost to subsidised
Australian canners.
A/
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A second attempt was made in 1921'when the co-operative
Meat Producers1 Exchange was established. Although the
Exchange included cattle owners throughout southern Africa,
two-thirds of its working capital came from Southern
Rhodesia. Its professed aim of securing 'fair' prices by
limiting supplies and by-passing the middlemen who infested
the important Johannesburg market aroused enormous hostility
amongst vested interests, and after some brief success the
Exchange was aborted through the shadowy actions of the
Imperial Cold Storage Company. From the moment that
the Exchange established 'close relations' with the Rand
Cold Storage Company over the huge 'compound trade1 along
the Reef, its fate was sealed. Unknown to the Exchange,
the R.C.S. Company was itself 'closely connected1 to the
I.C.S. Company. This fact was manipulated to draw the
Exchange into a dependent relationship secured hy a series
of large and mostly unnecesssary loans. The simmering
resentment felt by many South African cattle owners at the
strongly Rhodesian 'flavour' of the Exchange readily lent
itself to a canpaign designed to destroy confidence in its
management, and when rumours, of this kind reached banking
ears, the Exchange was obliged to look elsewhere for capital.
It did not have to look very far, however. Three of its
company members obligingly stepped forward with a £20 000
loan, repayable on call, in return for which they placed
their own nominees on the Exchange's board of directors. It
only later transpired that two of the companies concerned,
the B.S.A. Company and Liebigs, had compelling reasons for
coming to terms with the Rand's dominant cold storage interest:
Through Rhodes and De Beers, the B.S.A. Company was linked by
sentiment and hard cash to the I.C.S. Company, while Liebigs
28.
relied heavily on the Rand as a market for slaughter cattle.
The newly-enlarged board of directors lost no time in moving
the Exchange away from its past 'co-operative practice1. A
new business manager, responsible only to the board which
appointed him, promptly borrowed a further £30 000, this
time from the R.C.S. Company, his former employer. When
ordinary members objected to this and other dubious trans-
actions, the R.C.S. Company stopped distributing meat
supplies from the Exchange. Two large mining groups there-
upon cancelled their contracts, an action which cost the
co-operative almost half their trade. The back of the Meat
Producers' Exchange was effectively broken and in May 1923
it was forced into liquidation.
As a result, ranchers turned to the state for help,
and ironically enough, an invitation was extended1 to the
I.C.S. Company to come in by the front door. Sensitive to
charges that its policy was 'equivalent to handing over
Rhodesia, bound hand and foot, to the mercies of interests
that ... in other countries are regarded as the enemies
87
of cattle producers1/ the settler government tried hard
to interest other large companies in proposals to establish
a meat freezing industry in the colony, but with no success.
Southern Rhodesia's remoteness from the major world meat
markets, specifically Britain, and the limited number and
generally poor quality of its cattle held little attraction
for established American and British meat packing trusts.
Vestey s the biggest of the British firms, whose operations
embraced South America, Australia, New Zealand and Madagascar,
as well as refridgerated steam ships and almost 4 000 retail
outlets/
29
outlets in Britain, 'would not consider working in Africa,
much less Rhodesia under any circumstances'. Rhodesia, said
Lord Vestey, 'had not the cattle or the country to compete
O Q
with South America'. Only Liebigs, largely interested
in low-grade cattle for its meat extract works, had found
the colony to be a suitable base for its operations, and then
only after extracting every imaginable concession from the
8 9B.S.A. Company.
With no real choice in the matter, particularly once
the South African government imposed weight restrictions on
90live cattle imports in ?924, Southern Rhodesia had to conte.
itself with the I.C.S. Company. Although of overwhelming
regional importance, the I.C.S. Company was insignificant
outside southern Africa. Even so, it was only coaxed into
Southern Rhodesia by an agreement, confirmed in 1924, which
among other benefits, gave it a.ten-year monopoly over the
export of frozen and chilled meat. Moreover, the company was
guaranteed that if in any year its profits fell below ten
percent of its capital, the state w.auld make up the diffe-
91
rence to a maximum of £15 000.. The agreement worked
smoothly at first, but began to break down over the provision
calling for the development of exports to overseas markets.
These markets, while better-paying than anything in Africa,
demanded larger quantities of quality beef at lower prices
92than the settlers could regularly supply. For its part,
the I.C.S. Company was too small to force its way into major
world markets, especially as the period 1925-7 was one of
cut-throat competition. This was the era of the so-called
'Meat War1, during which the major trusts eliminated smaller
competitors and fought over the size of their shipping quotas
and/
30.
93
and market shares- The I.C.S. Company's energies anyway
were dissipated by efforts to corner the large meat trade
generated by Katanga's copper mines, where it was soon
embroiled with another regional em-Ln.ence grise, the 'vil-
lainous Mr Bongola Smith1. Smith, whose business empire was
centred in Brussels, was also largely interested in the cattl
trade, and between him and the I.C.S. Company, it was widely
regarded as 'a dirty game, and'a network of intrigue covering
Cape Town, Salisbury, Bulawayo, Livingstone, Elizabethville,
94Brussels and New York'. The Southern Rhodesian government,
concerned that the I.C.S. Company's intervention in the Congo
would lead to price-cutting at the expense of ranchers
exporting cattle on the hoof, objected to the colony's
freezing works being used for purposes other than the develop-
ment of overseas trade. After considerable wrangling, in
which the I.C.S. Company insisted that it needed financial,
help if it was to bid competitively on international markets ,
a fresh agreement was patched together. An export bouitywas
instituted, and in 192 9 the company at last won an Italian
contract for 8 000 tons of beef. But the bounty notwith-
standing, it still lost money, and the cattle industry remaine
as far, perhaps further, from establishing itself on lucra-
tive export markets as it had been at the start of the
95decade-
By this time, the plight of tobacco planters was despe-
rate.. Their traumatic experience really began in 1924 when
Rhodesian tobacco, painfully recovered from its fall ten
years previously, was favourably received at the Wembley
Empire Exhibition in London. In the same period the relative
profitability/
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profitability of tobacco cultivation had been considerably-
enhanced by the slump in cattle and maize prices precipi-
tated by the recession of 1921-2, and by the related increase
in the supply of black labour which facilitated a shift
towards this labour-intensive branch of production without
inducing significant upward pressure on wages. Prices
and prospects went higher still when in July 1925 Britain
increased imperial preference on tobacco by 50 percent,
causing Southern Rhodesian growers to turn their backs on
the South African market which had previously filled their
horizons, and concentrate on meeting what they thought was
Britain's huge demand. 'Many of the largest independent
manufacturers in Great Britain, as well as representatives
of the. Imperial Tobacco Company ... /are7 all pleased with the
quality of Rhodesian tobacco and keen to do businessy
enthused the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal in 1925, ' /Eu"£7
until such time as there is a larger permanent supply, say,
seven to eight million pounds annually/ of Southern Rhodesian
tobacco for sale in England, our tobacco will only be used
for blending purposes *.. The amount available must be
increased and the continuity of supply assured in order to
97
obtain the full benefit which this market offers'.
With prices in 1925 and 1926 far in excess of low pro-
duction costs, white farmers abandoned cotton and maize
98growing for the 'leaf of gold1: 'all eyes are turned on
tobacco. Every farmer one meets talks about it and very
handsome profits have been made or are anticipated being
9 9
made as a result of this year's crop1. The industry's
expansion was startling. Acreage planted with Virginian
leaf/
32.
leaf approximately doubled every year for four years; from
7 500 in 1925 to 13 000 in 1926 to 30 000 in 1927 to an
estimated 50 — 60 000 in 1928. The number of planters also
increased rapidly/ from 189 in 1925 to 763 in 1927. By
1928, the tobacco industry boasted 3 000 curing barns, 500
grading sheds and 700 bulking sheds, accommodating the 24,4
million lbs produced by 50 000 black labourers and 987
planters.
The bubble was not long in bursting. 'In retrospect',
admitted the industry's chroniclers, 'there is something
almost pathetic about a group of ingenuous and isolated
farmers sitting in their rustic high-ceilinged boardroom
in the village which was Salisbury, blundering confidently
into the vortex of international financial and political
interest. Visitors told them their tobacco was good; they
were learning the art of growing it; there seemed no
101logical reason why they should not be able to sell it'.
In fact, a very large proportion of the gigantic crops of
1927 and 1928 was of extremely poor quality. Inexperience
in the case of newcomers to the industry was compounded by
greed on the part of established planters. 'The tendency
to go beyond the reasonable limits of available finance
greatly hampers the arrangements for the following season's
crop1, noted the Government Tobacco Expert in 1927,
and renders more urgert the sale of the crop
immediately after it is prepared for marketing.
Under the above circumstances there is also an
inclination to rush the crop through the barns
by harvesting immature leaf, crowding the barn
beyond normal capacity, and hastening the curing
in/
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in order to forward the tobacco for sale at
the earliest possible opportunity.
As a result, much of the tobacco reaching Britain was dis-
covered to be 'of an undesirable character, being thin and
flimsy, almost entirely lacking in silkiness1. 'The tobacco
on the whole is very dead1, concluded an investigation con-
ducted on behalf of the Southern Rhodesian government, 'and
of a very pale lemon colour ... Even the better grades are
103
more or less green tinged and unripe1. Not surprisingly,
it proved virtually unsaleable on the British tobacco market.
No less important was the fact that the dominant manu-
facturing concerns, interlinked with American interests, found
it neither feasible nor desirable to use Empire leaf on so
large a scale. Even had Southern Rhodesian tobacco been of
a uniformly high quality, no major company was willing to
disturb the established tastes of the smoking public. Rhode-
sian Virginian tobacco was quite different from the American
leaf used in British manufactured cigarettes, and several
attempts at promoting an all-Rhodesian product by appeals to
Empire sentiment ended in failure before the Southern Rhodesia:
government and settlers grudgingly conceded that their best
hope lay in the gradual blending of their tobacco with popular
1 04brands. 'Appeals to patriotism counted for little where
a man's palate was concerned', reported an official from
London. 'Preference and price were the real factors'.
Still more to the point, the 'great British firms were
not prepared to throw into imbalance a nicely and profitably
secured adjustment of vested interests'. The world tobacco
market had originally been divided by arrangement between
the/
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the Imperial Tobacco Company, which accounted for three- .
quarters of the British tobacco trade, and the hugely capita-
lised American Tobacco Company. Their joint operating venture
outside of the metropolitan United States and Great Britain
was the British American Tobacco Company. In Britain, the
LT.C. had the trading rights of A.T.C. brands; in America, the
A.T.C. had the trading rights of I.T.C. brands; and in most
other countries, B.A.T-. held the 'rights and trademarks of
both the older organisations'. An anti-trust judgement
by the American Supreme Court in 1911 broke the A.T.C. into
smaller components without significantly affecting this
1 fl 8division of spoils. Although American tobacco was largely
used, the I.T.C. was not averse to strengthening its position
within the consortium by nurturing alternative sources of
supply. It was, however,; determined to do so on its own
terms, without alarming its American partners, and certainly
not at a pace and on conditions set by colonial planters.
Before 1924, the B.A.T. subsidiary with which settlers
were most familiar was the United Tobacco Company, established
in Cape Town in 1906. Its involvement in the Rhodesian tobaccc
trade predated the First World War when the company provided
growers with a degree of financial support and their one
significant market. But only selected planters were helped
and many growers were convinced that the U.T.C. boomed the
industry in order to stimulate production, only to break it
when successive planters' cooperatives threatened to become
too powerful. A contract signed in 1918 between the Rhodesian
Tobacco Cooperative Society and the U.T.C. did little to dispel
had already
the suspicion and bitterness which^enveloped the industry.
Members/
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Members of the cooperative soon argued that buyers manipu-
lated the classification of tobacco grades so as to 'batter*
prices downwards while the company, irritated by the in-
creasingly tru c tilent attitude of the cooperative, did its
best to weaken the producers' organisation by favouring one
particular group of growers over the rest. Consequently,
when the new settler Minister of Agriculture declared in
1924 that 'if a market was opened up in England and the
Continent for Rhodesian Tobacco it would immediately put
the growers in this country in a position to get out of the
hands of that monopoly of the United Tobacco Company which
during the last few years has been considered by Tobacco
Growers to be a very grievous burden1, the cooperative,
recently transformed into a limited company in order to gain
109
more control of marketing, needed no further prompting.
The Rhodesia Tobacco Warehouse and Export Company, as
the cooperative had now become, at once began to develop an
overseas export market. Advantage was taken of the Wembley
Exhibition to bring samples of Rhodesian tobacco to the
attention of British manufacturers, but the very success which
attended this first venture infused subsequent business forays
and negotiations with a mixture of arrogance and ignorance
calculated to confirm the worst suspicions of the industry's
controlling interests. Independent buyers at the 1927 sales
were 'allowed ... to go back empty handed', and the U.T.C.
was only offered tobacco on terms which the Warehouse 'knew
... they would never agree to'. Even I.T.C. representa-
111tives were treated indifferently. Instead, the Warehouse
set/
36.
set up its own selling organisation. Disposal of the entire
crop was placed in the hands of merchant bankers, Chalmers
Guthrie and Company. This was done in order to eliminate
the brokers and dealers who stood between producers and
manufacturers, and because the Warehouse was well aware that
the shaky financial condition of most of its members pre-
cluded the lengthy delay which normally attended payment
for tobacco sold by brokers. 'Merchant Houses', noted an
observer, 'are usually employed by those requiring more
finance than the dealer can provide with the aid of his
112
ordinary banking facilities'.
Chalmers Guthrie, however, were not closely associated
with the tobacco trade, and had no regular clientele of
buyers. Because of arrangements previously made to finance
the sale of the crop, they were also unable to offer estab-
lished brokers their customary commission on sales. Dealers
therefore had no financial incentive to place Rhodesian
tobacco with manufacturers. Indeed, they had every reason
for 'getting supplies from other countries and pushing them
113
against Rhodesian'. By antagonising the British tobacco
trade, the Warehouse set the seal on the fate of the Southern
Rhodesian industry. Brokers and manufacturing companies unite
against Warehouse practices and prices. 'There is no doubt
our people after last year's big prices were swollen-headed
and expected the manufacturers to be on their knees begging
for it', acknowledged the colony's Premier. 'We seem to have
a lot of "Momparas" /r"ools_7 at the head and in charge of our
tobacco industry1.
As/
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As unsold tobacco bales piled up in British warehouses.
Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Agriculture confided in his
South African counterpart that 'history has repeated itself
with us'. 'A long struggle between the growers and buyers',
explained Fletcher,
punctuated by alternative periods of shortages
and gluts, high prices and no prices at all,
culminating in the tobacco boom two or three
years ago, brought about partisans say, deli-
berately, by the big prices given during the
previous seasons, when 3/-, 4/- and even 5/-
a 1b was given for the best bright leaf, which
today can only be sold at an average of 1/3d,,
with large quantities, and lower grades
unsaleable.
Faced with the imminent collapse of the industry, the
settler government hurried to the rescue of the Tobacco
Warehouse with over £500 000 to pay off merchant bank loans
and to put at least some cash in growers' pockets and the
hands of unpaid labourers. Many planters nonetheless
faced ruin and by 1930 700 of them had abandoned the industry
Production fell as once more domestic interests lay pros-
trate before international capital, leaving the I.T.C free
to buy 'the best grades ... but at its own prices',
While the helping hand extended to tobacco growers
was economically and politically unavoidable, it was also
exceptional. Other supplicants were usually ignored. For
example, the state refused to act on the annual resolutions
passed by the Rhodesia Agricultural Union calling for a
system of controlled production and compulsory marketing
of/
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residing in the dry and crowded Lower Gwelo reserve. Nor
was recovery shared by tens of thousands of poor peasants
brought to the starting point of proletarianisation by state
policies in previous decades, and for whom depression and
drought were the final blows. The rate of indigenous
African participation in the labour market began to increase
rapidly as a result. Whereas the rate had remained static
at around 20 percent between 1911 and 1922, it climbed to
23 percent in 1923 and to 35 percent in 1926, by which time
Southern Rhodesia was well on the way to becoming a labour
surplus economy. This structural change was of considerable
importance as it greatly facilitated the rapid emergence
1 32
of export-orientated settler agriculture in this period.
At the other end of the scale, a comparatively small
number of individuals continued to own huge herds of cattle.
Differentiation was less marked in Mashonaland districts
where herds ranged in size from ten to fifty head, than in
Matabeleland where it was not unknown for iziduna to possess
herds of up to 2 000 cattle. Cattle ownership in
Nyamandhlovu 'varied quite a lot•, according to the local
NC. 'A few of them own several hundred head; others are
1 34
just beginning to get a herd together'. In the over-
crowded Selukwe reserve, where most people only had one or
two beasts, 'one man owned 155 head, and quite a number ...
owned forties and fifties', while in Gwanda, two large
cattle owners minimised their losses from drought in 1927
by exporting hides directly to Port Elizabeth.135 Overall,
it seems that ownership of economic herds of cattle, vari-
ously/ . . .
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of maize. It even dismissed widespread agitation for
government labour recruitment during the cotton and tobacco
118booms. Although special aid was given to smallworkers
to tide them over postwar inflation, and the cold storage
agreement was negotiated on behalf of ranchers, on the whole
the government confined itself to the provision of research
services and loans through the agency of a Land Bank estab-
lished in 1924. It eschewed 'any direct commitment in the
field of production, by, for instance, providing price
119
supports, or in that of marketing1. Far from directing
an unrestricted process of domestic accumulation, the Souther:
Rhodesian Government, although narrowly responsible to a
settler electorate, was itself located within the 'wider
sphere of capital's subordination of other classes in "civil
120
society"1. Encompassing the economic, political, and
ideological interests of capital in general, the settler
state sought to contain- and channel the antagonistic relation,
and contradictions engendered by the unceasing struggle to
secure the many different conditions necessary for the
121
creation and appropriation of surplus value. Through
the ideological practice of segregation, the colonial state
encapsulated the contradiction between the economic interests
of mining and agricultural capitals and the social and poli-
tical conditions necessary for the undisturbed reproduction
of capital. It thus continued to discriminate against
African rural areas, frozen in a structurally subordinate
position since the passage of the Native Reserves Order in
Council/
39
Council of 1920, while simultaneously setting in motion
policies intended to blunt the most immediate contradictions
which had sharpened in the meantime.
The general deterioration of the reserves in the early
1920s, accelerated by the postwar slump in grain and live-
stock prices and by severe drought in 1922, sufficiently
alarmed the state for 'developmental1 policies to be intro-
duced. Although Native Department voices had first called
for agricultural training programmes in 1907 and more
insistently at the time of the Native Affairs Committee of
1 22Enquiry in 1910-11, they had very largely gone unheeded.
After the war, selected parties of chiefs were invited to
1 23
inspect agricultural shows, and more importantly, indus-
trial training schools which looked to build on 'the
native/y -•• simple methods of agriculture and stock raising1
were opened at Domboshawa in 1920 and Tjolotjo in 1922,
but it was not until the devastating impact of drought com-
bined with economic recession that the urgency of the
situation was appreciated. 'Whichever way the native or the
Native Department turned /In 19227', wrote the C.N.C., 'the
economic results of the drought obtruded themselves ...
Famine conditions have been experienced in almost every
district ... The demand for native stock, already diminishing,
1 25practically ceased1.
From 1924, black agricultural demonstrators were
trained at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, and in the same year
a Native Trust Fund, supported mainly from dipping fees, was
established for the improvement of cattle and agriculture
generally/
40.
generally. Finally, in 1926 the post of 'Agriculturalist
for the Instruction of Natives' was created. Its first
incumbent, E. D. Alvord, was a former missionary of enor-
1 2 fi
mous drive and enthusiasm. As these initiatives coin-
cided with rising commodity prices after 1924, the next five
years saw a modest recovery in the reserves. Between 1926
and 1930, the number of carts, wagons and even motor vehicles
owned by blacks increased from 1 241 to 2 913. Grade bulls
owned by Africans and bought through the Native Department
1 27increased in number from 918 in 1925 to 3 737 in 1930.
Cattle found a market of sorts and grain production expanded,
especially once white farmers began to concentrate on tobacco
growing. Approximately 25 000 bags of maize were sold in
the Charter district alone in 1928. 'The majority of local
European farmers are dropping the growing of maize and buying
their requirements from natives, finding it more convenient
1 28
and economical to do so', explained the NC. In 1929, over
700 00 0 bags of maize were, harvested throughout the colony,
and the fact that almost 200 000 bags were marketed 'threa-
tened to become a serious problem' for settler farmers in the
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wake of tobacco's collapse-
The fruits of recovery, though, were unevenly distribu-
ted. Evidence accumulated in the mid and late 1920s of
overcrowding and overstocking in many reserves. This applied
particularly to smaller reserves such as Bushu, Mzingwane,
Que Que and Selukwe. 'When is the whiteman going to
leave this country, because the taxation is making it impos-
sible for me and my natives to live', complained one headman
residing/
41 .
residing in the dry and crowded Lower Gwelo reserve. • Nor
was recovery shared by tens of thousands of poor peasants
brought to the starting point of proletarianisation by state
policies in previous decades, and for whom depression and
drought were the final blows. The rate of indigenous
African participation in the labour market began to increase
rapidly as a result. Whereas the rate had remained static
at around 20 percent between 1911 and 1922, it climbed to
23 percent in 1923 and to 35 percent in 1926, by which time
Southern Rhodesia was well on the way to becoming a labour
surplus economy. This structural change was of considerable
importance as it greatly facilitated the rapid emergence
1 32
of export-orientated settler agriculture in this period.
At the other end of the scale, a comparatively small
number of individuals continued to own huge herds of cattle.
Differentiation was less marked in Mashonaland districts
where herds ranged in size from ten to fifty head, than in
Matabeleland where it was not unknown for iziduna to possess
1 33herds of up to 2 000 cattle. Cattle ownership in
Nyamandhlovu 'varied quite a lot 1, according to the local
NC- 'A few of them own several hundred head; others are
1 34
just beginning to get a herd together1. In the over-
crowded Selukwe reserve, where most people only had one or
two beasts, 'one man owned 155 head, and quite a number ...
owned forties and fifties', while in Gwanda, two large
..cattle owners minimised their losses from drought in 1927
i 35
by exporting hides directly to Port Elizabeth. Overall,
it seems that ownership of economic herds of cattle, vari-
ously/ . .
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ously defined between six and twelve head per family, was
slowly becoming concentrated in fewer hands. Evidence for
this process is impressionistic, however, because of the
way in which official statistics were averaged out for
the whole country, neither distinguishing between heavily
pastoral districts and the rest, nor specifying the wide
variation in herd sizes occasionally mentioned in official
correspondence. The underlying tendency is only glimpsed
after the Great Depression when investigations began to
uncover people who owned no cattle at all.
Those who could turn the vagaries of reserve geography
to good account also flourished-in the latter half of the
1920s. Market gardeners supplying the towns were particu-
larly successful. Having utilised the slump at the start of
1 37the decade to oust Indian competitors, they were well
entrenched by the end of the 1920s. m 1927, Umtali's
markets were filled with 'large quantities of pumpkins and
other vegetables, tomatoes, sugar-cane, bananas and ...
^ven7 strawberries and rhubarb1 grown by 'natives ^livingj
1 38
... near the town1. On the opposite side of the country.,
produce grown under irrigation and sold in Bulawayo, helped
to buy the '8 four-wheeled and 170 two-wheeled vehicles,
including a motor car and a motor lorry1 owned by 'Mzingwane
1 39Natives' in 1929. Richer cultivators living in more
distant locales not only grew comparatively big acreages
of maize, but turned to crops like wheat and potatoes which
140
could better withstand the cost of transport to market.
In most instances, their success was bought at the expense
of/
43.
of poorer neighbours. Until halted either by the inter-
vention of the local NC, or, as happened more often, by
the direct action of angry neighbours, rich peasants and
emergent farmers yearly augmented the agricultural and
grazing lands consumed by their ploughs and herds. Solomon
Ndawa, a blacksmith who farmed about 500 acres in Wedza
reserve, was in 'some trouble' by 1925 for 'encroaching
141
on land held by others'. Ndawana Sinyanga, who ploughed
19 acres and grazed 30 cattle in Chindamora reserve, simply
took the land he needed over the protests of neighbours
who claimed that although fallow, it belonged to them- Now,
lamented Sinyanga, 'I am surrounded. They ploughed there
all around me but they have not cultivated their fields.
They did this out of spite to prevent me from enlarging
my land',142
It was here, amongst the Sinyangas and others of his
class, that the impact of the state's agricultural advice
was clustered. Instead of 'raising the level of agriculture
143throughout the Reserve', agricultural demonstrators often
formed class alliances with the rural elite. As most demon-
strators were the sons of chiefs and headmen, or of messenger!
and mission-educated 'advanced natives', alliances of this
nature were frequently self-contained and self-sustaining.
'Many of our pupils £at Domboshawa and TjolotjoJ" are sent
by Native Commissioners, particularly the sons of messengers
and chiefs', observed the Director of Native Development.
'This, as it were, opens up the vision of a class of Govern-
ment employee who will be the pick of the natives of the
country/
44.
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country'. Mondoro reserve's agricultural demonstrator
was the son of the local chief, while in Chiota the first
person to cooperate with the demonstrator was Willie
Samuriwo, himself a chief's son and later ruler of the dis-
145trict. In Makoni, headman Gandanzara had wheat grown
for him by the agricultural demonstrator, and in Wedza, a
group of 'largely Anglican "progressive" farmers ... took
full advantage of the Demonstration programme' from the
moment it reached them. By 1932, they were producing 'some
of the best crops grown in Rhodesia, and were able to turn
over their maize direct to the Control Board classified as
Grade A with an advance of 5/- per bag while other natives
in the area had difficulty in selling for 3/- per bag in
trade from local traders. The maize from the plot owners
was so good that it was loaded on trucks at Marandellas
146for direct export 1. Agricultural demonstrators, remarked
the assistant NC for Goromonzi, by imbuing 'a few natives
with the idea of money-making 1, were effectively becoming
'the farm managers of a few enterprising and money-seeking
1 47plot owners'.
If, for reasons of kinship and class, the first port
of call by agricultural demonstrators tended to be of one
particular sort, it was frequently also their last. All too
often they were unwelcome anywhere else. The overwhelming
majority of rural dwellers turned their backs on agricul-
tural demonstration. They did so for two reasons. Because
the fixed priority of the 'poor' peasantry, that is most
cultivators, was the production of sufficient food to satis-
fy/
45.
fy their subsistence requirements, 'innovations in crops
and techniques ... Zpould7 be highly hazardous as they
diverted labour and/or land from the production of means
of subsistence, leaving no margin to meet a possible risk
of starvation should something go wrong with their com-
mercial crops or should a bad harvest occur before the full
14 8
effects of land-saving innovations had materialised1.
And in Southern Rhodesia, where there was 'about one chance
in five that a year will bring subnormal rainfall', the
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environmental constraints were considerable. Rural res-
ponsiveness to agricultural innovation was therefore partly
governed by collective assessment of potential benefits
weighed against known costs.
Within this context, and to the extent permitted by
the worsening financial position of most people, African
agricultural practices had nonetheless changed fairly
noticeably since the turn of the century. Invariably, rich
peasants, somewhat cushioned from risk by accumulated wealth,
acted as pathbreakers, but they were followed, albeit slowly
and hesitatingly, by growing numbers of ordinary people. An
expanding circle of cultivators practised seed selection,
upgraded their stock and abandoned hoes in favour of ploughs.
As early as 1910, it was reported from Matabeleland that
'improvement in the strain of the mealies grown is very
noticeable1, and by 1917 the 'small hard mealie /previ-
ous lyj cultivated by the natives ... Z^as7 gradually disap-
pearing1 from many areas. Less common because much more
expensive were efforts to upgrade cattle, but even so, the
collapse/ .......
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collapse of cattle prices in 1921-2 caused 'scrub' bulls
to be castrated on a greater scale, and by 1926 an 'increa-
1 52
sing desire ... to improve cattle1 was evident. Although
ploughs were too expensive for most peasant households, they
were much coveted and still more widely employed. While
some marginal growers purchased ploughs by pledging future
1 53crops and cattle to traders, many more hired their use.
Between 1921 and 1933, when 'possibly half the land utilised
for cultivation ... was ploughed', the number of ploughs
1 54
approximately quadrupled to 66 798.
In the second half of the 1920s, however, most poor
peasants were unpersuaded of the need to modify either their
crops or methods of cultivation in ways not of their own
choosing. fThe natives are a conservative people', wrote
the NC for Mrewa, 'slow to change their methods, methods
which they know will at least give them a certain return
in almost any season', especially as in 'some districts
the present extensive methods suffice to supply the needs of
the cultivators'. Indeed, although output per acre de-
clined during the decade, output per family remained con-
stant, as land was brought under the plough more quickly than
the population was growing. There was thus little reason
to respond to Native Department complaints that ploughs were
largely used as labour-saving devices which actually contri-
buted to poor farming practices. Consequently, it was only
in those districts where overcrowding was already a serious
problem that agricultural demonstrators were given a hearing,
but even then the numbers involved were extremely small.
Only/
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Only 157 people cooperated with agricultural demonstrators
-I CQ
in Selukwe reserve in 1928.
Apart from peasant cost-benefit calculations of the
kind specified above, many rural blacks also shunned the
state's demonstration programme because they were deeply
suspicious of the motives behind it. With the memory of
past reductions in fertile land holdings still extremely
fresh and sore, Africans had good reason to withhold their
cooperation. 'There is a feeling of scepticism among some
natives as to the motives underlying these demonstrations
of farming methods, and a doubt that they are a genuine
attempt to induce natives to use the reserves to better
advantage', reported Salisbury's NC. 'Rather do they see
them to be an attempt to test the agricultural potentialities
of the reserves with a view to their being exploited for
159the benefit of* the white population of the country'.
Earlier government afforestation schemes had ocasionally
foundered on similar perceptions: 'in one district, blue
gums were destroyed after a rumour circulated to the effect
that if they reached a certain height, white men would seize
the land on which they were growing'. A rumour spread
in 1927 that officials 'wanted people to learn more about
agriculture so that later a tax could be imposed on
ploughs', and even in Selukwe where conditions most
favoured agricultural demonstration, many people were con-
vinced that it was 'some scheme of the Government to take
1 fi 7their land away from them'. 'Is this not being done so
that we will all only be allowed to cultivate one acre?',
Alvord/
48.
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Alvord was asked after a lecture in 1929.
Interconnected with the state's 'developmental' agri-
cultural policies were moves to contain the revolution being
wrought by capitalism on the fabric of African society.
Emerging class antagonisms and aspirations were delayed
and blurred by the gradual formulation and patchy imple-
mentation of policies to prop up the disintegrating social
cohesion of the Ndebele and Shona peoples. By defining and
supporting 'traditional' rulers, and by modifying and con-
solidating African customary law, the settler state aimed
at disorganising the dominated classes through confining
their sphere of incorporation to a reconstituted "tribal
system".
An important turning-point in official thinking coin-
cided with the onset of economic recession at the start of
the 1920s. Up until that point, the voracious demand of the
mines and settler farms for labour had obliged the state to
employ every means at its disposal to break down the. inte-
grity of Ndebele and Shona socio-economic and political
organisation. Repeated attempts were made to wrench labour
from its non-capitalist nexus; structurally by war and then
by land theft; fiscally by taxation; and juridicially by
the contract, compound and pass systems. At the same time,
the state tried to recast and regulate the social functioning
of everyday life after images and patterns more amenable to
the rule of capital. Directly through legislation, and
indirectly through the teachings of the dozen or so Christian
missions dotted about the countryside, the cultural hegemony
- of/
49.
of colonialism was asserted over indigenous practices.
Ndebele and Shona cultures were decried as worthless by
164
government and church working in tandem. Their relation-
ship at this time was non-antagonistic, occasionally even
close, because Christianity's fragmented gospel
included such tangibles as Lancashire cotton,
cash crops, redbrick houses, Western medicine,
tombstones, books and money. The intangibles
pertained not only to Christianity's transcen-
dent God, but also to individualism, formal
schooling, the nuclear family, middle-class
values and virtues, skilled trades and ambi-
tion. All had religious meaning. Christian
conversion aimed at a cultural, as well as a
religious conversion. As missionaries were
fond of saying, the converted "set themselves
apart"; they "declared for a completely
changed life"165 .
Marriage, for example, was speedily brought within the ambit
of the colonial state, where it was stripped of practices
which government officials and missionaries found objec-
tionable. Polygamous marriages were- penalised by the Tax
Ordinance of 1901; and the Shona custom of female child
betrothal, kuzwarira, was outlawed, and the size of 'lobola1,
vovovo, pa y ments restricted by the Native Marriage Ordinance
16 6
of the same year. By 1902, Shona marriage, in the sense
of uniting families as much as individuals through the
mediated exchange of labour power and cattle, already lay
outside colonial law.
Initially, the state contemplated the consequences of
intervention with equanimity. Churches began making the con-
verts denied them so long as indigenous society had retained
its /
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its 'pristine vigour1, and efforts by women and young
men to throw off forms of customary oppression were hailed
as evidence of the impending demise of chiefly authority.
'Chiefs and elders of families complain that they no longer
control their following as they did in the past, and that
the young people are breaking away gradually from the old
tribal system of control1, reported the CNC.for Mashonaland
in 1912. 'Contact with civilisation is the cause of this, an>
though chiefs and others complain, no steps should be taken
to prevent this gradual evolution. The increased powers
granted to Native Commissioners have materially assisted
in breaking up these tribal methods of control, and I am
glad to say the results so far have been satisfactory1.
As dissolution proceeded apace, however, so a note of
alarm crept into official reports, 'The progress of the
transition from barbarism to civilisation continues in those
districts where frequent contact with civilising agencies
obtains1, noted one report. 'Native Commissioners report
a growing tendency towards individualism ... In the more
remote reserves the social conditions of the natives are
more healthy; they have not yet felt the combined influences
of the various civilising agencies which produce in the
evolution of the native character results not always satis-
factory ', Among the ' unhealthy symptoms' mentioned by
the C.N.C. were several which grew during the First World
War and matured in its aftermath. The vacuum created by the
breakdown of 'traditional' authority was increasingly filled
by forces and classes profoundly disturbing to the colonial
state. Even surface tranquillity was occasionally recog-
nised for what it was. 'Regarded as a whole1, wrote Bula-
wayo's/
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wayo's NC in 1914, ' ... the Natives have evinced as full a
measure of loyalty as we have the right to expect. This loyalty
is of a passive nature and would not, perhaps, stand any con-
siderable strain. The chief reason for the discernible lack of
enthusiastic loyalty is afforded by the land question1.
'The Germans are fools to fight the white people1, one official
was told. '-They will lose their country and cattle and the white
man will make them work1. Millenarianism, specifically Watch
Tower, amongst Nyasa migrants, appeared but was quickly suppressed
17 2in 1917, only to be followed by 'signs ... that /natives^ ...
have begun to realise that they constitute a considerable poli-
tical, social and economic factor in the development of the coun-
try1 . By the early 1920s, according to district reports, there
was 'unquestionably a risk of the trained and educated native
1 74giving a ready ear to the cry of "Africa for the African"'.
When confronted with these stirrings of popular discontent
and consciousness, the state fumbled for an appropriate response.
In part, this reflected the diversity of social forces released
by the uneven process of dissolution. Far from launching attacks
against fixed and timeless African social and economic structures,
the state, as discussed in chapter two, had operated in a context
where the advance of commodity relations was already tending to
dissolve the old order. Combined with capitalism's own uneven
development, this enabled middle and rich peasants to escape
comparatively unscathed, even as blows rained down on the poor
and on peoples north of the Zambesi. Consequently 'modernising'
farmers and migrants, Christians and animists, as well as rich
and poor, young and old, all contested place and position in the
space/
52.
space vacated by the ebbing class power of precolonial rulers.
But as economic recession and depression, at the beginning
and the end of the decade, aggravated existing antagonisms and
tensions between generations and between some social categories,
so self-defence prompted others to coalesce, thus providing the
state with building blocks for the construction of conservation.
In particular, middle and rich peasants, increasingly Christian
and 'modernising1, almost by definition male and middle-aged or
elderly, and frequently including economically reconstituted
chiefs and headmen within their ranks, found themselves threatened
by certain currents coursing through Ndebele and Shona society.
To take one key example, labour migration had long been 'part
of the terrain of struggle of partially formed classes',
where elders attempted to maintain control over the labour of
young men. Loss of authority could be catastrophic for senior
generations. As early as 1909, it was reported from the Matopos
that whites were 'steadily clearing natives off their land, the
given reasons being that the majority of youths and young men
are attracted to mines and elsewhere by higher wages, leaving
but few middle-aged and old persons available for the landowners's
requirements'. And by 1928, deputations of 'the older genera-
tion were unanimous in deploring the desertion of their sons to
the Union and asked for Government assistance to have them sent
back. Besides losing touch they complain of the lack of financial
17ft
assistance in their old age 1.
After some hesitation, the state decided to support 'chiefs
and elders and fathers and men against sons and daughters and
women'. Its first measures were cautious and pragmatic.
Segregationary/
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Segregationary discourse, although rising in volume, lacked
coherence, and the Native Department itself was split between
supporters of progressive individualism and advocates of restored
communalism. Contradictory policies therefore ran side by side.
For instance, not long after the state began to shore up 'tradi-
tionalism1, the Native Wills Act specifically recognised the
right of Christian blacks to make provision for the guardianship
181
of their children outside the realm of customary law. In-
creasingly, though, the advocates of reconstituted 'traditionalism
and 'tribalism' outpaced their rivals. The state had earlier
backed off from the 'lobola' provisions of the 1901 Marriage
Ordinance, and retreated still further in 19 29 when unregistered
18 2
customary marriages were recognised as valid. Adultery had
been made a criminal offence for blacks in 1916, and in 1927 the
Native Affairs Act bolstered the waning authority of chiefs and
headmen by insisting that their lawful orders be obeyed. 'Inso-
lence and contemptuous behaviour towards ... £Ehem was made7 a
criminal offence punishable by a maximum fine of £20 or six
-too
months imprisonment in lieu of payment'. The Act also estab-
lished an Appeal Court whose subsequent public reports initiated
18 4the consolidation of 'native law and custom1.
The tribal system under construction during the 1920s was designed
to channel popular hopes and grievances into outlets very largely
controlled by the state itself. It bore only passing resemblance
to pre-colonial forms. To start with, the 'tribalism' condoned
and supported by the state was geographically circumscribed.
Although many NCs encouraged 'Africans to move into the reserves
... /ASJ a means by which to slow down the break-up of the tribal
system/
54
•1 Q C
system1, in most cases it involved movement away from areas
lived in for generations. The ambiguity of 'traditionalism' in
such settings was manifest. Indeed, later protagonists contended
that 'the African tribes in Rhodesia today are'in no way identi-
fiable with tribes which existed prior to the conquest of Rhodesia
... but are essentially administrative units created by admini-
1 8 fi
strative action1. Moreover, the specified duties of chiefs,
18 7
who anyway only held office 'contingent upon good behaviour1,
were clearly biased towards countering the political and social
threat posed by 'detribalisation'. Ranked as constables in
designated areas, they were not only obliged to help in the col-
lection of tax, but were also held responsible for the good con-
duct of their followers. They were required to arrest law-
breakers and report subversive rumours. And not least, the autho-
rity supposedly returned to them was actually quite different
from the powers rulers had exercised before the 1890s. Whereas
in the past, chiefly authority had been limited by the need to
retain popular approval, as well as by custom and spiritual sanc-
tions ,
this system of checks and balances was severely
modified by the introduction of European admini-
stration, which buttressed the chief's residual
powers. No longer could the people escape from
the jurisdiction of an unpopular ruler by the
simple expedient of moving away; such movement
required the NC's authority and in most instances
he would tend to support the chief.
Political legitimacy so narrowly defined could accommodate
neither the independent initiative of the Ndebele National Home
Movement (later the Matabele Home Society) for a restored king-
ship/
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ship in a consolidated 'national home', nor meet the modestly
incorporationist requests of the tiny black petty-bourgeoisie
voiced through the Rhodesia Native Association and the Rhodesia
Bantu Voters Association. Led by Nyamanda Khumalo, elected suc-
cessor to Lobengula in 1896, and advised by members of South
Africa's African National Congress, the National Home Movement
took advantage of influential audiences gathered at postwar con-
ventions in Versailles and London to petition Britain's King
George V. 'In pursuance of the fact that the right of conquest
... is now repudiated by the civilised world1, the petition
requested Britain to assume direct responsibility for 'native
administration1, and to 'hand back the so-called unalienated
land to the family of the late King Lobengula in trust for the
tribe according to Bantu custom, and the right of Chieftainship
therein to be restored and acknowledged*. The Imperial authori-
ties rejected the petition out of hand, as did the new High Com-
missioner, Prince Arthur of Connaught, in 1921. Nyamanda's
cause was subsequently taken up by his nephews, Lobengula's
grandsons, Albert and Rhodes. On their return from school and
exile in the Cape, the two brothers spent several years demanding
'king's cattle' from iz-iduna rewarded by the Administration for
loyalty during the risings. They also collected funds for the
purchase of land, until the Native Department caught up with
them at the start of the 1930s. As before, the state refused to
entertain, the idea of a paramount chief. Rhodes Lobengula was
eventually induced to leave for the Cape in 19 34, and Albert,
pathetically, became a messenger-interpreter in the Bulawayo
-1 O O
offices of the Native Department.
Founded/
56.
Founded in 1924, the Rhodesia Native Association primarily
expressed the aspirations of 'advanced' farmers in Mashonaland.
Of all inter-war black organisations and groupings, the R.N.A. was
the
/.most moderate. It self-consciously distanced itself from more
radical rivals and tried hard to cultivate a special relationship
with the government. 'We do not want Kadalie £p£ the I.C.Uj to
speak for us1, said one member in 1928, 'we can speak to our
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Government1. Although the Native Department accepted the
R.N.A.fs bona fides, especially after 1927 when the conservatism
of its leadership tilted towards obsequiousness, it nonetheless
frequently rebuffed the association's approaches. In 1922 a
request to exempt registered black voters, of whom there were
1 90
only 23, from the pass laws, was turned down. In 1924 the
191R.N.A. was forbidden to operate in the reserves. And in 1928,
the Native Department ignored the R.N.A.'s stated objection to the
custom enforced throughout the colony of blacks removing their
1 92hats in the presence of whites.
The similarly constituted, if briefly more radical, Rhodesia
Bantu Voters Association received even shorter shrift from the
1 93government. Matabeleland based, the R.B.V.A. drew its support
from progressive farmers and teachers. South African blacks, in-
cluding its founder Abraham Twala and chairman Garner Sojini,
figured prominently in its ranks. Convinced that the centre
of political gravity had passed from London to Salisbury with
the granting of Responsible Government, Twala advocated cooperation
with settler politicians in return for concessions and privileges
, 1 94
for 'civilised Bantu . At its inaugural congress in January
1923, the Association called for the 'modification' of the pass
laws, a lowering of franchise qualifications, and educational
improvements/
57
1 95improvements. When these resolutions failed to elicit any
response from the state, the R.B.V.A. attempted to add weight
to its representations by broadening its base. During 1924
and the first months of 1925, Martha Ngano, a Mfengu Apostolic
Faith Mission teacher who had become R.B.V.A. Secretary, busily
extended the Association's activities into the countryside around
Bulawayo. Popular grievances -such as dipping fees and dog licence
began to find a place on the R.B.V.A.'s list of demands. NCs
were-condemned for suppressing African 'rights and interests',
but the only lasting success secured by Nganofs campaign to widen
support for the R.B.V.A. was to confirm the state in its attitude
of measured antagonism. 'Natives should be tactfully informed1,
Coghlan instructed the C.N.C,, 'that the Government's desire is
that they should make their representations direct to their
197
officials and not to trust themselves to political agitators'.
Unsympathetic towards the aspirations of the colony's black
elite, the state was unrelentingly hostile to other more dramatic
challenges which it faced from millenarianism and trade unionism
in the late 1920s. The threat posed to capital and state by the
Watch Tower movement's vision of millenarian upheaval passed
through two distinct phases. The first largely coincided with
the prophecy of Watch Tower's founder, Charles Russell, that the
Second Coming would happen in 1923, especially as it was also a
period of continuing economic recession and 'uncertainty about
1 98
changes in the settler political structure'. Carried south-
wards by Nyasa labour migrants, Watch Tower had found its most
responsive audiences in Southern Rhodesia's biggest mine compounds
Congregations totalling about 200 members and perhaps several
thousand/
se.
thousand more or less interested followers were established
at Shamva, Wankie, the Globe and Phoenix and the Cam and Motor
Miners applauded preachers who attacked the pass laws and
promised an end to taxation, and at Wankie, workers were
assured that the last .would be first: 'The white people will
leave on 1 January. The first to go will be Mr Thomson /The
colliery manager/, with the Doctor and Mr Derby, and you Mr
Kidd /jEhe compound managerj. All of you /management^ shall gc
1 99
and your authority ... shall pass to the society 1.
Fearful that Watch Tower members were 'using religion as
a cloak to some extent for the purposes of a Labour Organisati
which ... will sooner or later lead to trouble', the col-
liery management pressed for action by the state. A leading
preacher was deported in November 1923, but by then the move-
ment's popularity had already peaked. During 1924, 'the
201
millenarian tide rapidly receded 1. An improving economic
climate, sooradic state harassment and the failure of Old Testament
figures Moses and Aaron to appear as prophesied in the main,
colliery compound, all contributed to Watch Tower's ebbing
fortunes. But most damaging in the long run was the narrow-
202
ness of the movement's appeal. Despite the occasional
invocation of wider horizons, Watch Tower's message was typi-
cally confined to the compound's 'labour aristocracy', most
of whom were mission-educated Nyasas. While complaints that
'the white people did not want the people to become clerks
in the offices because they were afraid of the natives getting
up in the world', accorded perfectly with the grievances of a
literate and semi-educated minority 1, they left the plight of
20 3the vast majority of workers untouched. Believing that
they were 'better informed and that other natives ... /could7
204 acquire
not follow their ideas on religion', Watch Tower members^
a/
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a reputation for sobriety and respectfulness as much appreciated
by mine managements more sophisticated than Wankie's, as their
leadership and behaviour was resented by ordinary workers after
1924. By the end of the decade, Watch Tower's compound con-
stituency had dwindled to a few dozen adherents.
The second phase of Watch Tower activity was very different
from the first. It was also more formidable. In parts of
the Mashonaland countryside, Watch Tower gained an enthusiastic
following through its predictions of the imminent overthrow of
white oppression, and through its efforts to 'restructure demora-
lised rural society1. Beginning in 1925, Watch Tower emissaries
from north of the Zambesi made hundreds of converts in the Urungwe
Sipolilo and Lomagundi districts. Villagers were warned that
only those baptised into the movement would escape the whirlwind
coming in November 1926. Everyone else, especially whites, would
be blown away. Another prophesy in May 1929 promised the faith-
ful that they alone would be rendered bullet-proof during a great
conflagration due to start inside the year. 'In about six
months', so people in the Urungwe area were informed,
a flight of aeroplanes will come from America -
sent by a person who lives under the water there -
manned by black people, who will make an aerial
reconnaissance of the whole country. These negroes
will recognise their own people and will then
return to America. Shortly after this they will
return and bring war in their train. The white
people will then be driven out of the country and
the natives will be freed from all taxes and Euro-
pean control.
Alternatively, 'the millenium would be brought by a trinity of
saints, Reyi, John Chilembwe pleader of the 1915 Nyasaland
Rising/
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Rising7 and Mariya1, who would give believers
a potent to drink from a cup. This will send the
recipient to sleep for seven days. When they
awake they will be white and have £sjma.ssed wealth.
They will not need to work ... All people will be
on an equal footing financially and socially.
Those who have not dipped /|Eaptised7 will die or
, 207
turn into animals.
Prophesies and visions such as these held enormous appeal
for a considerable segment of Shona society. The people most
receptive to Watch Tower's message were precisely those elements
who posed the greatest threat to the resuscitated 'tribalism
supported by the state and its black allies. In the first place,
it tended to be a movement of the rural poor. The late 1920s
were years of mounting rural distress. This applied particularly
to districts like Urungwe and Lomagundi distant from major mar-
kets, and which were further afflicted by an expanding zone of
tsetse fly infestation. 'The kraals in the area were mostly
miserable affairs1, reported a para-military patrol in 1929,
'inhabited mainly by old men and crowds of women. There were,
of course, no cattle, sheep or goats, and the only domestic
animals seen were a few dogs, which appeared to be "fly-struck",
2 08
and a miscellaneous collection of chickens'. Still more
specifically, the Lomagundi area was shaken by the boom and
collapse of the tobacco industry. Its inhabitants had watched
white settlers occupy land throughout the district in 1925 and
1926, only to see most of them depart again after a few years.
But the whirlwind which removed the majority of farmers from
the land also left hundreds of unpaid and jobless labourers in
its/
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its wake. Some found employment in Bulawayo and Matabeleland;
others returned to their villages where they swelled the ranks
of the poor and dissatisfied.
Secondly, Watch Tower appealed to younger men and women. Your
men resented the comparative wealth of elders whose economic and
social power was increasingly dependent on the state, while women
objected to the submissive stri ctures of a revitalised patriarchy.
Both were readily accommodated by a movement which neither recognis
chiefly authority nor required its members to 'salute ... their
elders'. Instead, Watch Tower offered a vision of an alternative
society in which wealth, including that of whites, would be shared
out amongst the faithful. Conflict and tension would disappear,
as baptism made it 'impossible for the "dipped" person ever again
to bewitch or to be bewitched'. It was a dream which even attrac-
ted numbers" of elderly men, presumably those outdistanced by the
Christian elite, and for whom paradise was appropriately symbolised
by the promise that 'great wealth will accrue to believers through
the sale of their produce to the American blacks; for eggs one
pound will be paid, for a fowl one pound and for a goat two pounds'
None of these visions of the future commended themselves to
the settler state. From the start, the Native Department harassed
Watch Tower members. NCs were instructed to arrest any foreign
blacks 'behaving suspiciously in rural areas ... and to punish any
210indigenous Africans who harboured them'. In 1926, 15 preachers
were deported. When Watch Tower flared up again in 1928, govern-
ment officials were advised to 'forget about the law1. Intimida-
tion became rife once Native Department messengers were told, 'Look,
you just beat those fellows up, and chase them back across the
border/
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border 1. Preachers who had avoided earlier sweeps were identi-
fied by spies, and they too were deported. Para-military police
patrolled Lomagundi district in 1929, and after the unit withdrew,
a 'general policy of promoting discipline ... /!through7 strict
212
compliance with all the laws affecting Natives' was enforced.
In the face of these persistent attacks, Watch Tower quickly lost
momentum, and by the early 1930s had surrendered its apocalyptic
vision to the 'more subdued millenarian message 1 of the Shona
21 3Zionist and Vapostori movements.
The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, established in
the colony in 1927, proved rather more resilient to attacks by the
state. Following an approach from Southern Rhodesian workers,
organiser Robert Sambo was despatched northwards by the leader of
the South African I.C.U., Clements Kadalie. For five-months. Sambo
operated clandestinely in and around Bulawayo. By the time he was
arrested and deported, the state had lost its opportunity. As
early as March 1927 the union claimed 155 members and its ideas
21 4
were spreading rapidly. 'The time is now come1, declared Sambo,
'when all natives should be united with one body in the name of
Africa ... So I ask you this day to join the movement and we fight
215for our Africa. Take away the word1.
Although briefly shaken by Sambo's deportation, the I.C.U.
survived. Under local leadership, notably Masotsha Ndhlovu, Job
Dumbutshena and Charles Mzingeli, it rooted itself successfully
in the Bulawayo Location. Meetings advertised by large posters
regularly drew crowds of up to 400 people on Saturday and Sunday
216
afternoons. A branch was established in Salisbury in 1929, and
over the next two years a further eleven branches were formed. By
1932/
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21719 32 the union had 4 910 members. Grievances articulated by
the I.C.U. covered a spectrum extending from the petty bourgeoisie
through the rural areas to the urban working class. Consequently,
the content and tone of its demands and speeches varied considera-
bly. On occasion, the I.C.U. sounded almost benign. For example,
one of the first resolutions approved by the Union at the annual
conference in April 1931 merely asked the government to adopt
Cape franchise qualifications. 'When sifted of all hyperbole,
their aims appeared to differ very little from those of the many
other Native Associations which exist in this country*, concluded
Bulawayo's Superintendent of Natives.
They desire better educational facilities, better
wages for skilled men, better facilities for
bringing their grievances to the notice of the
Government, and that the residential quarter of
the Town Location should be divided so that there
should be an exclusive quarter for the educated
people, who should not be expected to live .in
proximity to the barbarians; in fact they recog-
nise, and desire us to recognise, class distinc-
tions amongst their own people. Masotsha in his
speech emphasised that they did not seek to attain
21 9
their ends by violence ...
At other times, though, organisers were far less conciliatory.
•There is no difference between a person born in Rhodesia than a
Slave1, so an audience was bluntly told in 1930.220 Workers were
chided for strike breaking, and the need for organisation and
unity stressed. 'When the white people were striking, you went to
work and helped the Company, and yet the Company do not pay you
any more money. I don't blame the Railway Company for that, I
blame you', said one speaker. 'We must organise'.221 Yet informinc
both extremes was a similar set o.f assumptions. Perceiving the
diversity oftheir following to be a source of strength rather than
weakness/
64.
weakness, the I.C.U.'s leadership tried to hold the Union's broad
c o nstituency together through appeals to political and economic
222
egalitarianism and to the British sense of 'fair play1. 'As
people of Africa we find that we are all in one class', declared
Masotsha. 'We are all suffering people and we are all paid less
because we are black ... We are Christians and want to live a
respectable life and give our children a good education ... You mus
speak for yourselves. If we feel that we are oppressed and that
the Government won't hear our cries, we will appeal to the Imperial
22Government. Britain says "Justice and freedom to every nation"'.
For all their threatened fury and occasional thunder, however,
the most serious challenge to capital accumulation in this period
was spearheaded not by Watch Tower or the I.C.U., but grew directly
out of changed conditions in the gold mining industry. In 1925
the postwar premium on the price of gold was removed, and from
that point Southern Rhodesia's gold output fell steadily. The
most important reason for this was as mines were worked deeper in
the 1920s, the cost per ounce tended to rise, either through a
falling-off in the value of the deposit with depth, or because it
became more expensive to mine the deeper levels. When the mines
applied their time-honoured solution to rising costs of maximising
output and cutting expenditure on labour, they provoked widespread
strike action by black workers. For the first time since the
reconstruction of the industry, black miners enjoyed a relatively
strong bargaining position. The assistance given to African cash-
cropping in Nyasaland at this time and the expansion of other
sectors in the Southern Rhodesian economy all made the supply of
224labour tight and occasionally scarce.
Between December 1925 and October 1928, there were at least
ten/
65
ten strikes on various mines as workers resisted cuts and fought
for increases. Settler complacency was particularly rattled by
the strike at Shamva, a large gold mine some 70 miles north-east
225
of Salisbury. Management efforts to minimise costs by cutting
back on hospitalisation benefits were strongly opposed by workers
already resentful of dangerous working conditions in the open-cast
mine. An additional grievance for many workers was the credit
system. As the captive clientele of mine stores, labourers were
offered credit against future wages because 'it keeps them always
in debt and makes them work1. 'We never see our money1, complained
the miners.
From 12 to 17 September 1927, Shamva's 3 500 black miners,
mostly long-service migrants from Nyasaland, struck work for
higher wages. Pickets were detailed by workers with experience
of the Rand, and the mine manager confronted by what he later
described as 'insolent ... natives, the majority being armed with
sticks and knobkerries. A large number of them also carried their
registration certificates and tickets on the end of sticks, and
shouted - "Look at the small pay"'. Subsequent attempts by the
C.N.C., newly arrived from Salisbury, to persuade strikers to returi
to work were .shouted down. 'We are all called baboons, and they
might as well get baboons to do our work', yelled one miner. 'We
are asking for more money'.
The state then systematically set about smashing the strike.
Police and Territorial Army reinforcements were rushed to the mine.
Miners' weapons were confiscated and the compounds sealed off.
Workers were treated to bayonet displays and to the sight of a
machine gun. 'Here ... we have troubles with White People1, wrote
one agitated worker, 'they wanted to kill us all because we stopped
to/
66
to work'. 'They sent 200 soldiers here1, added the writer with
understandable exaggeration,
and we still got 100 camped in our compound, to see us
working. They think we will stop again. They wrote
a letter to Bwana Kashon £l.e. Nyasaland Government/ to
have permission to kill us all, and he said, "All right
- kill them all, and he would send his soldiers to bury
us in the graves.
On 17 September the strike collapsed, and 28 suspected ring-leaders
were arrested, tried and deported. Similar strikes on lesser mines
were much more easily contained, but beyond victimising identifiabl
leaders and trying to ensure that wages generally did not rise,
there was little that mining capital and the state could do. With-
out wage reductions, the industry's output declined accordingly,
until by 1929 the amount of gold produced was smaller than in 1907.
O
67.
1 . Lee , 'Politics and pressure groups', 232-4.
2. H.Mss.FY4/1 /I , 'Memorandum re the new political situa-
tion in Southern Rhodesia1, by J. G. Macdonald, 20 July
1923.
3. H.Mss. CHS/2/2/1, Coghlan to Chaplin, 3 Mar 1920; Lee,
'Politics and pressure groups', 244-6. See also D. J.
Murray, The Governmen-al System in Southern Rhodesia
(London, 1970) , 210-11 .
4. As cited in Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups, 244.
5. Ibid.
6. Murray, Governmental System, 207, 125.
7. Palley, Constitutional History and Law of Southern
Rhodesia, 236-7.
8. Murray, Governmental System, 3.
9. Ibid, 4; Palley, Constitutional History and Law of
Southern Rhodesia, 224-5.
10. Wallis, One Man's Hand, 200.
11. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 25 May
1922, col 771 .
12. Gann and M. Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodes-la (London, 1964),
62.
13. Ibid, 68.
14. Round Table, December 19 32.
15. Paragraph based on S881/277/947, 'Principal shareholders:
Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd', 15 Dec 1925 ; A3/17/10,
Edmund Davis to Secretary, BSAC, London, 11 Feb 1915;
Phimister, 'The structure and development of the Southern
Rhodesian base mineral industry, 1907 - Great Depression1,
Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 1975, 9; S881/1353,
•Rhodesian/
68
'Rhodesian ranching developments', 15 July 19 26; E.
Potter, The Press as Opposition: The Political Rdle of
South African Newspapers (London, 1975), 38-9; and W. D.
Gale, The Rhodesian Press (Salisbury, 1962), 129. See
also. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups1, appendix III,
'The Rhodesian press1.
16. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 14 Mar
1935, col 91.
17. Murray, Governmental System, 138.
18. East Africa and Rhodesia, 23 Feb 1939. See also Galbraith
Crown and Charter, 48-86.
19. Murray, Governmental System, 138.
20. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 21 Mar
1930, col 144.
21. See Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 30
May 1924, col 8, and related debates in subsequent years.
22. The Reform Movement in Rhodesia (Salisbury, 1903), 47-8.
23. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 26 May
1921, col 1190.
24. Report by Brigadier-General F. D. Hammond ... on the
Railway System of Southern Rhodesia, 1926, 3 vols. For
Coghlan's threat of 'war to the knife between the Govern-
ment and the Railways', see H.Mss. NE1/1/1, Coghlan to
Newton, 13 Dec 1924. See also H. C. Hummel, 'Sir Charles
Coghlan: the premiership, 1923 - 1927', Historical
Association of Zimbabwe Local Series 35 (Salisbury, 1979) ,
14-16.
25. H.Mss. NE1/1/1, 'Rhodesian Railways Bill. Explanatory
Memorandum1, n.d.
26./
69.
26. E. G. Gibbons, 'The background to the Rhodesian Railway
Act 1 9 26', University of Rhodesia, unpub. M.A. , 19 75,
60-6.
27. See H.iMss. LE3/1/1, 'Hammond Report', Downie to Moffat,
11 Jan 1926.
28. New Rhodesia, 26 Nov 1932. For wider discussion, see
Phimister, 'Towards a history of Zimbabwe's Rhodesia
Railways'.
29. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates , 5 June
1929, col 1636.
30. Ibid, 24 Mar 1937, col 542.
31. H.Mss. NE1/1/2, Downie to Newton, 25 Nov 1928.
32. H.Mss. LE3/1/1, 'For discussion at Cabinet Meeting1,
Minister of Mines and Public Works, to the Hon. The
Premier, 11 Jan 1929.
33. Phimister, 'Towards a history of Zimbabwe's Rhodesia
Railways•.
34. Paragraph based on A3/17/12/1, B.S.A. Company, London, to
Wankie Colliery Company, 26 Apr 1923; S881/277/947,
'Principal shareholders: Wankie Colliery Co.. Ltd1,
15 Dec 1925; ZCB2/2/1, 'Capital history of the Wankie
Colliery Company Ltd from 1899 to 1948', 29 Mar 1949;
Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates , 25 May
1938, col 1167 onwards. The colliery also signed a price
fixing agreement in 1923 with the railways and mines, in
both of which the B.S.A. Company was more or less inte-
rested; see C. H. Thompson and H. W. Woodruff, Economic
Development in Rhodesia and Nyasaland {London, 1954) , 115
35. A3/17/18, Chairman, Charterland and General Exploration
and/
70
and Finance Company Ltd to H. U. Moffat, 27 Mar 1917.
36. A. E. Hadley, Willoughby's Consolidated Co. Ltd: 18 94 -
1944 (London, n.d.), 17; Report of the Secretary, Depart-
ment of Mines and Public Works, on Mines, for the year
1926, 3.
37. Paragraph, including direct quotation, drawn from
Rhode si an Mining Journal, Dec 1931, 707-09; H.Mss.
LE3/1/1, E. Davis to H. U. Moffat, 21 Jan 1925; and
Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates , 24 Apr
1930, col 1281. See also S254, E. Davis to J. W. Downie,
8 JUIE 1931.
38. Table compiled from Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual
Reports, various years; and N. H. Wilson, The Mining
Industry of Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury, 1933).
39. M3/3/9/1, Secretary, Bechuanaland Exploration Company,
to Secretary, B.S.A. Company, 1 June 1906.
40. A3/17/10, E. Davis to Secretary, B.S.A. Company, 11 Feb
1915.
41. A3/17/8.
42. For further discusion, see Phimister, 'The structure and
development of the Southern Rhodesian base mineral indus-
try1 .
43. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates , 17 Apr
1931, col 737.
44. Usually defined as 500 acres or less, they never accounted
for more than one percent of the area alienated to whites.
45. S881/1482/4, 'Southern Rhodesia - 1930. Mr Christopher
Turner's notes of his tour'.
46. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, 186. •
47./
71 .
4 7. Economic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia,
21 Mar 19 52.
48. P. Mosley, 'The settler economies: studies in the
economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900 -
1963', Cambridge University, unpub. PhD, 1980, 237.
49. Tawse Jolly, Real Rhodesia, 147.
50 . Report of the Department ~ of Agri.au. Iture for zhe year
ended 31 Mar 1904, 33.
51. Ibid; G. L. Guy and R. H. Orchard, 'Rhodesia's first
petrol driven tractor: Ivel agricultural motor No. 140'.
Rhodesiana, July 1969.
52. Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, Jan 1905.
53. Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year 1913,
2.
54. Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, Oct 1908; ibid, April
1910.
55. Bulawayo Chronicle, 10 Sept 1919.
56. Paragraph, including direct quotations, based on B.S.A.C.
Memorandum by Mr H. Wilson Fox upon Land Settlement in
Rhodesia (London, 1913), 63; Official Year Book of the
Colony of Southern Rhodesia, No. 1, 1924 (Salisbury, 1924)
245-8. After June 19 20, the amount of capital required
by intending settlers was increased to £2 000. In
practice, this stipulation was ignored. Ranchers were
advised that they would need considerably more capital
than the amounts specified for mixed farming.
57. As cited in Gann and Gelfand, Huggins , 70.
58. A1/5/9, 'Report by Sir Lewis Mitchell on his tour in
Rhodesia1, 25 Aug 1909.
59./
72.
59. R. Hodder-Williams, 'The British South Africa Company in
Marandellas: some extra-institutional constraints on
government1, Rhodesian History, 1971, 2, 61. See also
R. Reynolds, 'The British South Africa Company's central
settlement farm, Marandellas, 190 7 - 1910: from the
papers of H. K. Scorror1, Rhodesiana, July 1964.
60. D. Lessing, A Small Personal Voice (New York, 1975), 90.
See especially M. C. Steele, "'Children of Violence" and
Rhodesia: A study of Doris Lessing as historical obser-
ver ', Central Africa Historical Association Local Series
No, 29 (Salisbury, 1974).
61. S881/1482/4. For detailed discussion of the various land
settlement schemes, see Machingaidze, 'Development of
settler capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia',
chapter two.
62. Report of the Director of Agriculture for 1910, 1.
63. S881/1482/4.
64. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 12 May
1925, cols 368-9.
65. Ibid, 30 July 1924, col 1296; S480/114, 'Advances to
Farmers', 18 Dec 1924; Official Year Book ... 1924, 325.
66. S881/1482/4; Southern Rhodesia, Handbook for the Use
of Prospective Settlers on the Land (Salisbury, 1930), 81.
67. S9.81/1, Minister of Agriculture and Lands, to Secretary,
Department of Agriculture, 15 Nov 19 28.
68. Ibid.
69. S881/1482/4. 'Women as well as men are addicted', reported
Turner. '3 or 4 whiskies at 1/- each are consumed daily.
30/- per week on whisky is out of all proportion to their
income/
73.
income'.
70. Hutchinson, Caps to the Zambesi , 89 .
71. Rose Innes, Writ-ing in the Dust, 12.
72. Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year 1911,
31 .
73. See, variously, Thomas, Agricultural and Pastoral Pros-
pects , 273; and S881/1482/4.
74. Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for
the year 1927, 1. 'Many new growers ... seem to think
the closer they plant the heavier the yield will be 1,
commented the report.
75. S1180/51(15), 'Maize Growing in Southern Rhodesia1.
See also Report of the Acting Secretary, Department of
Agriculture, for the year 192 9, 30, quoting the Executive
Committee of the Maize Association that 'there was no
occasion for the Department of Agriculture further to
demonstrate the advantages of green manuring, for farmers
were already convinced of this, and their only difficulty
was the financial one of throwing large areas out of
maize and into green manure crops'.
76. Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year 1920,
5.
77. Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for
the year 1927, 41.
78. Tawse Jolly, Real Rhodesia, 155.
79. G. Page, Jill's Rhodesian Philosophy (London, 1910), 5.
80. Clements and Harben, Leaf of Gold, 98.
81. Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for
the year 1928, 14.
82./
74
82. Table compiled from S1180/51(5), Maize Inquiry Committee,
28 Nov 1930; Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Develqpxiz.
in Southern Rhodesia, 1924 - 1950 (Salisbury, 1975),
appendix; and Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, 92.
83. Table reproduced from SI 180/51 (15), Maize Growing in
Southern Rhodesia. See also Report of the Economic
Development Committee , 1939.
84. For wider discussion of what follows, see Phimister,
'Meat and monopolies: beef cattle in Southern Rhodesia,
1890 - 1938', Journal of African History, 1978, 19, 3.
85. Arrighi, 'Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia1, 107.
86. For the canning factory, see Rhodesia Agricultural Journal
1915, 12, 487-8; Rhodesia Advertiser, 10 Feb 1916;
G1/5/2/3, 'Canning Factory1, and attached correspondence;
and Independent, 27 August 1920. See also Weinmann,
Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Rhodesia
... 18 90 - 19 2 3, 113-14. For the Meat Producers1 Exchange
see Independent, 2 Sept 1921, 10 Mar 1922, 16 Feb 1923,
22 June 1923; Meeting of the Representatives of the
Cattle Industry of the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia,
Swaziland, Bechuanaland and South-West Protectorates,
Johannesburg, 24 March 1921 (Johannesburg, 1921); Second
and Final Report of the Committee of Enquiry in respect
of the Cattle Industry of Southern Rhodesia, dealing with
its Investigations in the Union of South Africa, 1923,
1924; and The Times, 16 June 1923.
87. Bulawayo Chronicle, 15 Sept 1923.
88. S1193/M5, 0. C. Rawson, Rhodesia Ranching Co. Ltd to
Chairman, Rhodesia Cattle Commission, 1 Feb 19 24. For
discussion/ ......
75
discussion of Vestey's operations, see L2/1/201, 'Notes
of interview with Mr William Vestey of Vestey Bros.1, 12
Mar 1913; Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates t
25 June 1923, cols 281-3. See also R. Perren, The Meat
Trade in Britain, 1340 - 1314 (London,- 1978), and S. G.
Hanson, Argentine Meat and the British Market (Stanford,
1938).
89. L2/1/134/4, 'The Liebig's Extract of Meat Company's Pro-
perties', 17 Nov 1913: 'The Liebig Company seem to have
been allowed to take to a preposterous degree the best
parts of the country . . . /theyj7 have had extreme liberty
in their choice and have ... run most erratic boundary
lines to embrace the better spots and to exclude less
desirable portions ... The extraordinary configuration of
the blocks must exert a harmful influence on the develop-
ment of the district and is calculated to prove a serious
hindrance to future ranching enterprise in that neighbour-
hood. Access in many directions is interfered with;
almost all available surface water is taken in1. See
also Phimister, 'Meat and monopolies', 405-6.
90. See chapter five,
91. 'Agreement with Imperial Cold Storage1, Rhodesia Agri-
cultural Journal, 1924, 21, 633-6.
92. H.Mss. NE1/1/4, Newton to Fletcher, 3 Apr 1929.
93. Hanson, Argentine. Meat, chapter nine; P. Smith, Politics
and Beef in Argentina (New York, 1969) chapter five.
94. Sir Charles Rey, '"Monarch of all I survey": Bechuanaland
Diaries 1929 - 1937', ed. by Q. N. Parsons, unpub. 1977.
95. H.Mss. LE3/1/1, 'Memorandum summarising discussion with
the/
77.
the Directors of the Rhodesia Export and Cold Storage
Company1, 30 Oct 1928; T. Haddon to Minister of Agri-
culture, 20 Mar 1930, and attached correspondence.
96. Arrighi, 'Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia1, 110.
Tobacco required 10 x as much labour as an equivalent
acreage of maize; see Steele, 'The African agricultural
labour supply crisis, 1924 - 1928', unpub. 1973; and
V. M. Wadsworth, 'Native labour in Agriculture1, Rhodesia
Agricultural Journal, 19 50 , 47.
97., Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 1925, 22 , 40.
98. Clements and Harben, Leaf of Gold, 96-7.
99., H.Mss. NE1/1/6, Leggate to Newton, 18 June 1926.
100. Clements and Harben, Leaf of Gold, 98; S1180/4(14),
Imperial Economic Committee, Tobacco Enquiry, 9 May
1928, Summary of Discussion on the Marketing of Southern
Rhodesian Tobacco.
101. Clements and Harben, Leaf of Gold, 102.
10 2. Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for
the year 1927, 41.
103. S881/663/3379, 'Report as the result of a visit of Mr
0. Siemssen and Mr A. V. Maunder', 9 Aug 1928.
104. H.Mss. NE1/1/7, Downie to Moffat, 19 June 1928; S1180/4
(8), H. Hopkins to Minister for Mines and Public Works,
5 Sept 1928, and attached reports. See also Clements
and Harben, Leaf of Gold, 100-108.
105. S1180/4(8)(2), H. Hopkins, Report No. 14, 4 Jan 1929.
106. Clements and Harben, Leaf of Gold, 101.
107. W. T. Davies, Fifty Years of Progress: an account of the
African organisation of the Imperial Tobacco Company
190? -/
77.
190 7 - 19 57 (London, n.d.), 9 - 10.
108. M. Corina, Trust in Tobacco: The Anglo-American Struggle
for Power (London, 1975), chapters 7 and 8.
109. Paragraph, including direct quotation, based on S1180/4(1
'Copy of telegram from the United Tobacco Company, Cape
Town, to the Hon. Leggate, Minister of Agriculture, Salis-
bury1 , and attached correspondence. See also S1193/T3,
Leggate to Downie, 3 Nov 1926; and Clements and Harben,
Leaf of Gold, 66-96.
110. H.Mss. NE1/1/2, Downie to Newton, 24 Oct 1927.
111. H.Mss, NE7/1/1, Moffat to Newton, 12 Dec 1927.
112. H.Mss. NE1/1/7, Downie to Moffat, 19 June 1928.
113. Ibid.
114. H.Mss. NE7/1/1, Moffat to Newton, 5 Dec 1927.
115. S1180/7CI9A), Fletcher to Kemp, 13 Dec 1929.
116.. Ibid.
117. Murray, Governmental System, 70-1.
118. Steele, 'The African agricultural labour supply crisis'.
119. Murray, Governmental System, 60-1.
120. B. Bozzoli, The Political Nature of a Ruling Class:
Capital and Ideology in South Africa 1890 - 1933 (London,
1981), 18.
121. B. Jessop, 'Recent theories of the capitalist state1,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, \^11, I,
122. E. Punt, 'The development of African agriculture in
Southern Rhodesia with particular reference to the
interwar years', University of Natal, unpub. M.A., 1979,
62; Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry,
1910-11 (Salisbury, 1911), 15.
123./
79
123. B. K. Long, Drummond Chaplin (London, 1941), 226-7. See
also N9/1/22, NC Bulawayo, report for 1919.
124. Report by H. S. Keigwin, Esquire, Native Commissioner,
on the suggested Industrial Development of Natives
(Salisbury, 1920); and Southern Rhodesia Legislative
Council Debates, 24 July 1923, col 575 onwards.
125. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 192 2 ,
1. Drought relief cost the state £50 000; see G. Passmor
The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia
(Salisbury, 1972), 18.
126. Zachrisson, An African Area in Change, 190; Palmer,
Land and Racial Domination, 202.
127. Arrighi, 'Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia', 192.
128. S235/506, NC Charter, report for 1928.
129. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year
1929, 4.
130. Arrighi, 'Labour supplies', ; and Steele,
'The foundations of a "native policy": Southern Rhodesia,
1923 - 1933', Simon Fraser University, unpub. PhD, 1972,
411-12.
131. S96, Morris Carter Commission 1925, evidence of T. 0.
Beattie.
132. Arrighi, 'Development of capitalism1, 112-13.
133. ZAH1/1/1, Morris Carter Commission 1925, evidence of R. C.
Nesbitt; ZAH1/1/2, evidence of W. E. Farrer.
134. ZAH1/1/2, evidence of S. W. Greer.
135. S96, evidence of S. J. Wane; S235/505, NC Gwanda, report
for 1927.
136. Steele, 'The economic function of African-owned cattle in
Southern/
79.
Southern Rhodesia, 1914 - 1943', unpub. 1977, 7.
137. See for example, N9/1/25, NC Umtali, report for 1922.
138. S235/505, NC Umtali, report for 1927.
139. S235/507 NC Mzingwane, report for 1929.
140. S235/504, NC Insiza, report for 1926; Report of zhe
Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1926, 2.
141. S96, evidence of H. M Meade.
142. ZAH1/1/1, evidence of N. Sinyanga. See also ZAH1/1/4,
evidence of W. A. Devine; evidence of B. Garandi and J.
Gusha; S235/507, NC Mazoe, report for 1927.
143. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year
1932, 5.
144. Report of the Director of Native Development, 1921, 18;
as cited in van Onselen, 'R6le of collaborators1, 417.
145. S235/508, NC Hartley, report for 1930; AOH/3, Oral
History Programme, National Archives, .W. Samuriwo, inter-
viewed 10 Feb 1977.
146. Ranger, 'Poverty and prophetism: religious movements in
the Makoni district, 1929 - 1940' , unpub. 1981, 7.
147. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1932,
5.
148. Arrighi, 'Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia1, 194.
See especially J. Tosh, 'The cash-crop revolution in
Tropical Africa: an agricultural reappraisal', African
Affairs, 1980, 79, 314.
149. Beach, 'Shona economy', 43.
150. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland, for
the year 1910, 7.
151. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1917,
8
- 152./
80.
152. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year
1925,3.
153. S235/506, NC Mazoe, report for 1928.
154. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"1, 361-2.
155. S235/503, NC Mrewa, report for 1925.
156. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year
1927, 3.
157. Yudelman, Africans on the Land, 237-8.
158. Re-port of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year
192 8, 18. See especially Mosley, 'The settler economies',
125-39.
159. S235/505, NC Salisbury, report for 1927.
160. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 366.
161. Ibid, 376.
162. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, 219.
163. S235/507, NC Mrewa,- report for 1929.
164. See for example, W. R. Peaden, 'Missionary Attitudes
to Shona Culture 1890 - 1923, Central Africa Historical-
Association Local Series 2 7 (Salisbury, 1970).
165. K. Fields, 'Christian missionaries as anticolonial
militants', Theory and Society, 1982, 11, 96.
166. Zachrisson, 'An area in change', 303-04.
167. Amongst many others, see Bhebe, Christianity and Tradi-
tional Religion, chapter 5.
168. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, for
the year 1912 , 1 .
169. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year
1915, 2.
170. N9/1/17, NC Bulawayo, report for 1914.
171 ./
1.
171. N9/1/18, NC Salisbury, report for 1915.
172. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 197.
173. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year
1913 , 1.
174. N9/1/25, NC Mazoe, report for 1922. See especially
N9/1/26, S.o.N Umtali, report for 1923.
175. F. Cooper, 'Peasants, capitalists and historians: a
review article1, Journal of Southern African Studies,
1981, 7, 2, 295.
176. See Martin, 'Beyond the peasant to proletarian debate1,
unpub. 1982.
177. NB6/1/10, NC Matopo, report for 1910.
178. S235/506, NC Gwanda, report for 1928. See also, for
example, S235/505, NC Melsetter, report for 1927; and
Vambe, An Ill-Fated people, 197-205.
179. Ranger, 'Poverty and prophetism: religious movements
in the Makoni district, 1929 - 1940', unpub. 1981, 8.
180. This interpretation follows Steele, 'Foundations of a
"native policy"', 519.
181. Ibid, 140.
182. See variously, J. F. Holleman, Shona Customary Law (Cape
Town, 1952); R. D. Leslie, 'The recognition of tribal
law in Southern Rhodesia1, University of Cape Town, unpub
M.A. , 1963; H. Child, The History and Extent of Recog-
nition of Tribal Law in Rhodesia (Salisbury, 1966); and
E. V. Mittlebeeler, African Custom and Western Law (New
York, 1976).
183. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 77.
184. Ibid, 137.
185./
82.
185. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, 145.
186. as cited in G. K. Garbett, 'The Rhodesian chief's dilemma:
government officer or tribal leader?', Race, 1966, 2, 118.
187. What follows, including direct quotations, comes from
Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', chapter two.
188. Paragraph, including direct quotations, based on Ranger,
African Voice, 6 9-8 7, 186-190; and Steele, 'Foundations
of a "native policy"', 182-7. See also Palmer, Land and
Racial Domination, 151-3, 226-7.
189. as cited in Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"1,
163.
190. N3/21/5, CNC to Secretary, Department of Administrator,
20 Feb 1922. For blacks on the Voters Roll, see N3/3/9,
CNC to Secretary, Department of Administration, 3 Nov 1921
191. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy", 163.
192. S235/506,-NC Victoria, report for 1928. For further dis-
cussion of the R-1SLA, see Ranger, African Voice, 104-8;
J. R. Hooker, 'Welfare associations and other instruments
of accommodation in the Rhodesias between the World Wars',
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1966, 9, 1;
and Peaden, 'The contribution of Epworth Mission settle-
ment to African development', in Ranger and J. Weller (eds
Themes in the Christian History of Central Africa (London,
1975) , 147-8.
193. Unless otherwise stated, the following section on the
R.B.V.A. is drawn from Ranger, African Voice, 90-104.
194. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"1, 161.
195. N3/21/6, 'Memorandum on formation of Rhodesia Bantu
Voters' Association', n.d., and attached correspondence.
196./
83.
196. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"1, 161.
197. S138/22, Coghlan to CNC, 4 Feb 1925.
198. van Onselen, Chibaro, 206.
199. Ibid, 205.
200. Ranger, African Voice , 146.
201. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"1, 199.
202. This interpretation follows van Onselen, Chibaro, 206-209.
203. Ibid.
204. Ranger, African Voice, 144.
205. van Onselen, Chibaro, 208-209.
206. Unless otherwise indicated, the following three paragraphs
including direct quotations, are drawn from Ranger,
African Voice, 202-15.
207. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"1, 201.
208. Outpost, 1929, 7, 3, 6. See also J. Ford, The Rdle of
the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology (Oxford, 1971),
300-01.
20 9. C. T. Taylor, 'Lomagundi1, Rhode si ana, 1964 , 10; and
Phimister and van Onselen, 'The political economy of
tribal animosity', 16-17.
210. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"1, 200.
211. Oral./H03, Oral History Programme, National Archives,
H. R. G. Howman, interviewed 10 Aug 1971.
212. Outpost, 1929, 7, 3; S235/508, NC Lomagundi, report
for 1930.
213. Ranger, African Voice, 222.
214. Workers Herald, 18 Mar 1927.
215. S1671/2265, 'Robert Sambo - Organising Secretary of the
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union - Southern
Rhodesia/
84.
Rhodesia', n.d. and extracts from correspondence.
216. R. Gray, The Two Nations (London, 1960), 165; and Steele,
'Foundations of a "native policy"1, 169.
217. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, 227.
218. N206/1/C5/3, I.L.O. Archives, Geneva, 'First Conference of
the Independent Industrial & Commercial Workers' Union
of Africa, 3-6 April 1931'.
219. S138/41, S.o.N. Bulawayo, to CNC Salisbury, 31 Oct 1928.
220. S138/267, F. Pritchard, detective, to Chief Superintendent
C.I.D., Bulawayo, 13 July 1930.
221. as cited in Hooker, 'The African worker in Southern
Rhodesia: black aspirations in a white economy 1927-36.',
Race, 1964, 6, 2, 144.
222. See especially H. Bradford, 'The Industrial and Commercial
Workers' Union in the South African countryside: notes on
• ideology', unpub. 1981.
223. S138/22, J. D. Watt, detective, to Chief Superintendent,
C.I.D., Bulawayo, 5 Aug 1*929.
224. Phimister, 'History of mining', 125-9, 137-9.
225. For the evidence on which the following paragraphs are
based, see Phimister, 'An emerging African proletariat:
the Shamva mine strike of 19271, in Phimister and van
Onselen, Studies in the History of African Mine Labour.
